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INCENTIVIZED INFORMANTS, BRADY, RUIZ, AND 
WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT: REQUIRING PRE-PLEA 
DISCLOSURE OF MATERIAL EXCULPATORY 
EVIDENCE 
Markus Surratt* 
Abstract: An incentivized informant scandal recently hit Orange County, California 
where county officials were caught lying, hiding, and not providing information about their 
informants. Concerned citizens, attorneys, and scholars are beginning to ask more questions 
as these stories receive increased nationwide attention: what should we do about false 
incentivized informant testimony? What can we do? 
Under Brady, Giglio, Ruiz, and their progeny, in criminal cases the government must turn 
over any material exculpatory evidence that it possesses, or that is available, when the 
defendant decides to go to trial. However, if the government does not know—or purports not 
to know—about material exculpatory information, such as an informant’s testimonial history, 
then there are often inadequate guidelines, rules, or incentives in place for the government to 
seek out and turn over this type of information. Moreover, because about 95% of state and 
federal cases end in plea deals, an informant’s credibility usually eludes public, judicial, and 
the accused’s scrutiny. 
This Comment offers solutions for legislatures, courts, and other government actors to 
use to help reduce wrongful imprisonment caused by false incentivized informant testimony. 
First, it outlines the types of information about incentivized informants that the government 
should seek out. Second, it offers several solutions and, working within United States v. 
Ruiz’s framework, this Comment suggests a legal standard for when the government must 
provide material information about an informant before a plea deal: when the government’s 
case primarily relies on informant testimony but material exculpatory evidence in its 
possession shows actual innocence. 
INTRODUCTION 
Andrew Chambers is a professional snitch. For almost three decades, 
Chambers has made a living working as an undercover informant for the 
government by testifying in court on criminal prosecutions.1 Since 1984, 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2018. Thank you to Lara 
Zarowsky, Director of the University of Washington’s Legislative Advocacy Clinic. My experience 
in her clinic helped shape my topic. And thank you to the Washington Law Review team for their 
editorial work on this Comment. 
1. Dennis Wagner, DEA Reactivates Controversial Fired Informant, USA TODAY (June 5, 2013, 
7:22 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06/05/dea-reactivates-controversial-
informant/2390989/ [https://perma.cc/P86H-MSPS]; see also Michael D. Sorkin & Phyllis Brasch 
Librach, Top U.S. Drug Snitch is a Legend and a Liar, ST. LOUIS DISPATCH (Jan. 16, 2000), 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/top-u-s-drug-snitch-is-a-legend-and-
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Chambers worked with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) on over 
280 cases.2 Chambers, with a rap sheet exceeding a dozen crimes, 
reportedly made four million dollars during his first year as an 
informant.3 However, Chambers’s career was seemingly cut short in 
2000 after the Justice Department discovered that he committed perjury 
in at least sixteen of his cases.4 
But Chambers resurfaced again in the late 2000s as a DEA informant 
in a drug case in Phoenix, Arizona.5 Federal authorities did not explain 
why they decided to reinstate Chambers as an informant.6 Yet shortly 
after the public learned of Chambers’s reappearance and involvement in 
the Phoenix case, federal prosecutors dismissed the drug smuggling 
charges against the defendants in the case.7 The U.S. Attorney’s Office 
in Phoenix did not comment on their sudden decision to drop the 
smuggling charges.8 
Chambers’s story is an outlier, but by no means unique in the 
incentivized informant world.9 His story is an extreme example of why 
                                                     
a/article_aecd2026-0306-5afc-85f6-7ffa066a5bb7.html [https://perma.cc/X8SQ-SEW3] (describing 
Chambers’s long history of informing for the government). 
2. Wagner, supra note 1. 
3. Id. Adjusting for inflation in December of 1984, that amount is $9,415,650.52 in January  
of 2018, as calculated from Inflation Calculator, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, https://www.bls.gov/data/ 
inflation_calculator.htm [https://perma.cc/39GC-SJPG] (follow “Inflation Calculator” hyperlink; 
then input “4,000,000” in “December 1984” and buying power as in “January 2018”). Other sources 
believe this is Chambers’s total career snitch earnings. See Sorkin & Brasch Librach, supra note 1. 
4. Wagner, supra note 1; see also Andrew Murr, King of the Drugbusters, NEWSWEEK (July 2, 
2000, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/king-drugbusters-161927 [https://perma.cc/8U42-
QUSP] (“Chambers said he had never been arrested, when in fact he had been—10 times between 
1984 and 1998, according to government records . . . .”). Interestingly, Chambers said “ninety-five 
percent of my cases was done accidentally, just being at the right place at the right time.” The 
Speaker Agency, Andrew Chambers, The Accidental Narc, YOUTUBE (Dec. 23, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sGGMpsN_Zl4 [https://perma.cc/W736-YT85]. Chambers was 
“at the right place at the right time” for over 200 cases. Id.; Wagner, supra note 1. 
5. Wagner, supra note 1. 
6. See id.; Nick Wing, The DEA Once Turned A 14-Year-Old into a Drug Kingpin. Welcome to 
the War on Drugs, HUFFPOST (Oct. 24, 2014, 10:47 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/ 
10/24/dea-war-on-drugs_n_6030920.html [https://perma.cc/S9EY-QYWP]. 
7. JJ Hensley & Dan Nowicki, Case Built on Informer Falls Apart, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (June 5, 
2013), http://archive.azcentral.com/news/articles/20130605case-built-informer-falls-apart.html 
[https://perma.cc/DJ6Z-SUDK] (“[T]he move to dismiss the case has prompted at least one member 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, which has jurisdiction over the DEA, to raise the issue of a 
federal investigation into the decision to use Chambers in the first place.”). 
8. Id. 
9. But see Rich Lord, Court Files Reveal Million-Dollar Informants, PITT. POST-GAZ. (Apr. 26, 
2014, 11:30 PM), http://www.post-gazette.com/news/nation/2014/04/27/Telling-for-Dollars-Court-
files-reveal-DEA-million-dollar-informants/stories/201404270144 [https://perma.cc/H4W9-4RXU]. 
Andrew Chambers Jr. was only one of several million-dollar informants. Another informant 
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better rules should regulate using incentivized informants: juries, courts, 
prosecutors, and defense counsel should be able to accurately assess an 
informant’s credibility. 
An incentivized witness is any witness who testifies on behalf of a 
party for a tangible or expected benefit—from the government or 
otherwise—in a trial proceeding.10 This Comment focuses on 
incentivized witnesses who testify for the government in exchange for a 
tangible or expected benefit, such as money or reduced criminal 
punishment. These latter witnesses will be referred to from here on as 
“incentivized informants.” This Comment does not focus on the Good 
Samaritan or other individuals who only testify in court to reduce and 
prevent crime in their communities. 
There are three major issues with incentivized informant testimony. 
First, some informants, whose statements go unchecked by government 
actors, can game the system, remaining free from punishment while 
duping law enforcement and prosecutors.11 Second, when these 
incentives are not disclosed to all participants in a criminal proceeding, 
the parties lack the information needed to make well-informed 
assessments of an incentivized informant’s credibility.12 This holds 
especially true for juries, but it is also important for prosecutors, law 
enforcement, courts, and defense counsel. Lastly, unchecked 
incentivized informant testimony can place innocent people in jail or 
prison.13 There have been numerous cases where a person was wrongly 
                                                     
included the “Princess” who was an alleged DEA informant paid one million dollars over four years 
for drug bust cases. Id. 
10. See E.S.S.B. 5038, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017) (“‘Benefit’ means any deal, payment, 
promise, leniency, inducement, or other advantage offered by the state to an informant in exchange 
for his or her testimony, information, or statement, but excludes a court-issued protection order.”). 
This Comment only focuses on criminal trials with government witnesses, which places exclusive 
emphasis on witnesses testifying on behalf of the government against a defendant.  
11. A poignant example of this behavior was Leslie Vernon White, a snitch who successfully lied 
dozens of times to prosecutors and law enforcement. White was so good that he could even gather 
enough information while in prison to manufacture a false confession from another inmate. See Ted 
Rohrlich, Review of Murder Cases Is Ordered: Jail-House Informant Casts Doubt on Convictions 
Based on Confessions, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 29, 1988), http://articles.latimes.com/1988-10-
29/news/mn-329_1_murder-case [https://perma.cc/Y793-YG2G]. 
12. See, e.g., Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses, 
47 HASTINGS L.J. 1381, 1394 (1996) (describing the dangers of using criminal informants at trial); 
AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (3rd ed. 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/ 
publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_pinvestigate.html [https://perma 
.cc/MTW5-HNRC] (assigning to prosecutor’s a duty to seek justice). 
13. Indeed, Northwestern University School of Law’s 2003 study found that incentivized 
informants were a leading cause of wrongful convictions in capital cases, involving 45.9% of those 
cases. NW. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, THE SNITCH SYSTEM: HOW 
SNITCH TESTIMONY SENT RANDY STEIDL AND OTHER INNOCENT AMERICANS TO DEATH ROW 3 
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convicted and later exonerated after discovering that an incentivized 
informant’s testimony was false.14 
Brady v. Maryland15 in 1963, and Brady’s progeny, make clear that 
defendants and the accused16 have a right to access evidence held by or 
available to the government when that evidence is material to guilt or 
innocence for an upcoming trial.17 Concerning incentivized informants, 
this includes any material impeachment evidence.18 Impeachment 
evidence is information that challenges a witness’s credibility.19 
To solve the problem of wrongful imprisonment caused by false 
testimony by incentivized informants, one must identify and define 
whom these informants are, what incentives play a role in their 
testimony, and the kind of information that affects their credibility. 
This Comment begins by explaining Brady’s evolution since 1963, 
common portraits of incentivized informants, and some of the history of 
incentivized informants in America. Then this Comment offers several 
solutions to reduce wrongful imprisonment attributable to incentivized 
informant testimony. Part I gives an overview of how Brady’s 
requirements—including those emphasized in United States v. Ruiz20—
affect informant testimony and disclosures. It also summarizes the split 
among circuit courts about pre-plea disclosure of material exculpatory 
evidence. Part II briefly describes some of America’s history of using 
incentivized informants. Part III proposes solutions that government 
                                                     
(2004) [hereinafter THE SNITCH SYSTEM], https://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/02/SnitchSystemBooklet.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AMT-6DJY]. 
14. See, e.g., State v. Gassman, 175 Wash. 2d 208, 208, 283 P.3d 1113, 1113 (2012); State v. 
Statler, 160 Wash. App. 622, 622, 248 P.3d 165, 165 (2011); State v. Gassman, 160 Wash. App. 
600, 600, 248 P.3d 155, 155 (2011); State v. Larson, 160 Wash. App. 577, 577, 249 P.3d 669, 669 
(2011). All three men in the above cases were convicted by false informant testimony and later 
exonerated. 
15. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
16. This Comment refers to both defendants and the accused when discussing individuals affected 
by incentivized informants. When there is the need to distinguish between the two, this Comment 
does so. For purposes of this Comment, “defendant” means a person charged with a crime and 
awaiting a trial or further criminal proceeding(s). The “accused” means someone who is accused of 
a crime, regardless of whether this person is formally charged or incarcerated for an alleged crime. 
These terms may also refer to the status of convicted individuals before their charges, conviction, 
and incarceration. 
17. Id. at 87. 
18. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153–55 (1972). 
19. United States v. Harris, 557 F.3d 938, 942 (8th Cir. 2009) (“But impeachment of a witness 
involves evidence that calls into question the witness’s veracity. It deals with ‘matters like the bias 
or interest of a witness, his or her capacity to observe an event in issue, or a prior statement of the 
witness inconsistent with his or her current testimony.’” (citations omitted)). 
20. 536 U.S. 622 (2002). 
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actors, particularly prosecutors, law enforcement, legislatures, and courts 
can use to reduce wrongful imprisonment caused by using incentivized 
informants. Finally, Part IV suggests a pre-plea deal legal standard for 
requiring informant disclosure. 
I. BACKGROUND ON BRADY’S CONTOURS AND MATERIAL 
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE 
This Part first offers an overview of how Brady has developed since 
1963. This includes a summary of United States v. Ruiz and the split 
among the U.S. Courts of Appeals. It then describes the general types of 
informants in the American criminal justice system. 
A. Incentivized Informant Testimony is Loosely Regulated Under 
Brady, Giglio, and Ruiz 
This section is broken into several sub-sections. The first discusses 
the constitutional foundation of a defendant’s right to material 
exculpatory evidence. The second examines two types of material 
exculpatory evidence: witness credibility and impeachment evidence. 
The third covers the government’s investigative duties regarding 
material exculpatory evidence and situations when this evidence should 
be suppressed. The final sub-section summarizes recent applications of 
Brady and its progeny. 
1. Napue and Brady: Criminal Defendants Have a Right to Evidence 
Showing Their Innocence 
Since Napue v. Illinois21 and Brady v. Maryland,22 government 
prosecutors have been required to give materially exculpatory evidence 
in their possession to a criminal defendant: “suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates 
                                                     
21. 360 U.S. 264 (1959). Napue involved four men who murdered an off-duty police officer 
during a robbery of a cocktail lounge in Chicago. Id. at 265. One of the robbers, Hamer, was caught, 
convicted, and sentenced to 199 years in prison. Id. Hamer, an accomplice in the murder, testified 
against his fellow accomplice, Napue. Id. at 265–66. During his testimony, Hamer said that the 
prosecution did not promise to consider his testimony when sentencing Hamer, a lie that the 
prosecutor did not correct during the trial. Id. at 267. The Court found that this violated Napue’s due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 270–72. 
22. 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that defendant, who was convicted of murder, and whose 
potential accomplice testified against him at trial, deserved a new trial because the government 
failed to turn over evidence that this potential accomplice admitted to the murder while talking to 
law enforcement before trial). 
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due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution.”23 This right is rooted in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.24 
Brady involved a defendant who was convicted of murder.25 An 
alleged accomplice, Boblit, confessed to the murder in a government 
interview.26 However, the prosecution withheld Boblit’s confession from 
Brady until Brady was convicted of murder and sentenced.27 The U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that any prosecutorial suppression of evidence 
favorable to the accused violates due process when that evidence is 
material to guilt or punishment.28 
2. Material Exculpatory Evidence Includes a Witness’s Promise or 
Agreement with the Government 
Nine years after Brady, the U.S. Supreme Court in Giglio v. United 
States29 clarified that witnesses’ credibility, including their 
understanding or agreement as to their own future prosecution, is a type 
of exculpatory evidence that is favorable to a defendant.30 Such 
exculpatory impeachment evidence31 under Brady may be material 
depending on the strength of other evidence in the case.32 The accused 
need not have requested this information, or any other exculpatory 
information, for a Brady violation to occur.33 
                                                     
23. Id. at 87. 
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
25. Brady, 373 U.S. at 84–86. 
26. Id. at 84. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 87. 
29. 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
30. Id. at 154–55. 
31. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995) (“[T]he Court disavowed any difference between 
exculpatory and impeachment evidence for Brady purposes.” (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 
U.S. 667, 683 (1985))). 
32. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154–55; see also Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 451 (2009) (“The right to a 
fair trial, guaranteed to state criminal defendants by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, imposes on States certain duties consistent with their sovereign obligation to ensure 
‘that “justice shall be done”’ in all criminal prosecutions.” (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 
U.S. 97, 111 (1976))). 
33. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (“We have since held that the duty to disclose such 
evidence is applicable even though there has been no request by the accused . . . .” (citing Agurs, 
427 U.S. at 107)). 
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When deciding how to define “material,” the U.S. Supreme Court in 
United States v. Bagley34—a case where the government promised not to 
prosecute two informants in exchange for their testimony—gave this 
definition: “[t]he evidence is material only if there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable 
probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.”35 The Court also noted that exculpatory and impeachment 
evidence, both falling under Brady, are not constitutionally different 
from one another regarding the government’s failure to disclose 
information.36 
3. Suppressing Material Exculpatory Evidence Requires Examining 
All Evidence, Including Evidence Known to Government Actors 
Involved in the Case 
In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court further shaped Brady’s contours in 
Kyles v. Whitley.37 In Kyles, the Court held that the total impact of all 
evidence favorable to the defendant must be considered, rather than only 
examining each piece of evidence separately.38 The Kyles Court stated 
that the prosecution’s knowledge of evidence favorable to the defendant, 
and unknown to the defense, is not automatically a Brady violation.39 
The prosecution has the “consequent responsibility” to assess this 
cumulative impact and to know when there is a reasonable probability of 
a Brady violation.40 As a result, the Court assigned to prosecutors a 
“duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on 
the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.”41 Consistent 
with Brady, this “duty to learn” holds irrespective of the prosecution’s 
good faith or bad faith.42 
                                                     
34. 473 U.S. 667 (1985). 
35. Id. at 682. 
36. Id. at 676–77; see also United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002). 
37. 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
38. Id. at 420. 
39. Id. at 436–37. 
40. Id. at 437. 
41. Id. And this duty presumably extends to learn about favorable evidence concerning 
incentivized informants. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case No. 99-3096 (Brady Obligations), 185 F.3d 
887, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting “[t]he government concedes that it never conducted a full-fledged 
Brady search with respect to any agreements its various components may have had with [the 
adverse witness for defense,] Jones,” and that “[f]or the reasons stated above, that failure constituted 
a breach of the government’s ‘duty to search’ for Brady information” (citations omitted)). 
42. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437–38; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
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Additionally, the Court in Kyles held that prosecutors must turn over 
information that an informant made inconsistent statements when this 
information is material.43 Materiality hinges on whether there is a 
“reasonable probability” that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the proceeding’s outcome would have been different.44 
Evidence that is merely helpful to the defense is not enough.45 However, 
the defense does not need to show that the government’s disclosure of 
material exculpatory evidence would have resulted in the defendant’s 
acquittal.46 
To be a “true Brady violation,” the evidence at issue must favor the 
accused by being exculpatory or impeaching, be suppressed by the 
government willfully or inadvertently, and prejudice the accused.47 
Prejudice depends on whether there is a reasonable probability that the 
trial’s result would have been different if the suppressed information was 
given to the defense.48 
4. Perceived Limits and Applications of Brady Since the Millennium 
The new millennium began with further constrictions to the general 
Brady rule: the government seemingly only has to produce exculpatory 
impeachment material if the defendant decides to go to trial, but not 
during plea negotiations and the entry of a guilty plea.49 In Ruiz, decided 
in 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court, when considering the availability of 
informant impeachment information, stated that “[t]he Constitution does 
not require the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence 
prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant.”50 The 
                                                     
43. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 453 (“[T]he question is . . . whether we can be confident that the jury’s 
verdict would have been the same.”). 
44. Id. at 440–41. 
45. Id. at 436–37. 
46. Id. at 434. 
47. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999) (holding that defendant’s Brady violation 
claim was not satisfied because defendant failed to meet the “reasonable probability” required of the 
prejudice element). Compare id. at 293 (“[Witness] Stoltzfus’ vivid description of the events at the 
mall was not the only evidence that the jury had before it.”), with Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 
700–01 (2004) (“Regarding ‘prejudice,’ the contrast between Strickler and Banks’s case is 
marked . . . . [Witness] Farr’s testimony was the centerpiece of Banks’s prosecution’s penalty-phase 
case.” (emphasis added)). 
48. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289. 
49. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 623 (2002). 
50. Id. at 623. This constriction on Brady is particularly troubling given that 90 to 95% of all 
defendants plead guilty. ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE 
EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 78 (2009); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2010 
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS (2010), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default 
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Court reasoned that defendants who enter a guilty plea voluntarily waive 
their Brady rights knowingly, intelligently, and with sufficient awareness 
of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences, and satisfy 
constitutional requirements.51 
And four years later in 2006 in Youngblood v. West Virginia,52 the 
U.S. Supreme Court continued emphasizing Brady’s progeny: “Brady 
suppression occurs when the government fails to turn over evidence that 
is ‘known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor.’”53 In 
Youngblood, the defendant was accused and convicted of sexual assault, 
but appealed his conviction after evidence surfaced that an investigating 
state trooper found and failed to produce a written note supporting 
Youngblood’s consensual-sex defense.54 The Court found that 
Youngblood presented a viable Brady violation claim because of the 
state trooper’s failure to disclose the written note, and remanded the case 
for further consideration.55 Six years after Youngblood, the Court 
reaffirmed that, to prevail on a Brady claim, defendants need not show 
that they would have “more likely than not” been acquitted had the new 
evidence been admitted.56 Instead, only a reasonable probability that the 
trial’s outcome could be different is needed.57 
Lastly, in Wearry v. Cain,58 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that 
Louisiana’s failure to disclose information about a key informant-
witness gave rise to a viable Brady claim.59 The Court held that 
“[b]eyond doubt, the newly revealed evidence suffices to undermine 
confidence in Wearry’s conviction. The State’s trial evidence resembles 
a house of cards, built on the jury crediting [prisoner-informant] Scott’s 
account rather than Wearry’s alibi.”60 The government failed to disclose 
                                                     
/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2010/Stats_Nat_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4SMR-3ZLL] (as of 2010, the total percentage of federal cases ending in guilty 
pleas was 96.8% versus 3.2% going to trial, out of 83,941 cases). 
51. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 623. 
52. 547 U.S. 867 (2006). 
53. Id. at 869–70 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995)). 
54. Id. at 868. 
55. Id. at 870. 
56. Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 75 (2012) (holding that evidence of inconsistent statements—
witness telling police that he could not identity defendant as perpetrator but then identifying 
defendant at trial as the perpetrator—impeaching sole eyewitness testifying against the defendant, 
who was convicted of murder, was grounds for a valid Brady violation claim when not disclosed). 
57. Id. at 75–76 (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 440–41).  
58. __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1002 (2016). 
59. Id. at 1006. 
60. Id. 
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that the already-imprisoned informant Scott unsuccessfully attempted to 
obtain a deal with prosecutors before testifying, may have had a personal 
vendetta against the defendant, and coached another inmate to lie about 
the defendant’s involvement in a murder.61 The jury had convicted 
Wearry of capital murder based in large part on incentivized informant 
testimony.62 
From Napue and Brady to Ruiz and Wearry, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has placed a firm obligation on the government to safeguard a 
defendant’s constitutional rights.63 This requires the government to turn 
over material exculpatory impeachment evidence bearing on an 
informant’s credibility.64 Such impeachment evidence includes: prior 
inconsistent statements or false statements made by a witness or 
informant,65 any material exculpatory evidence favorable to the 
defendant that is known by others acting on the government’s behalf,66 
the prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony,67 charges the 
witness or informant is facing—if the charges are associated with a deal 
or bargain with the government,68 benefits the government promises to 
the witness or informant,69 and prior criminal convictions.70 But again, 
                                                     
61. Id. at 1006–07. 
62. Id. at 1003–04. 
63. See id. at 1006 (“But Louisiana instead charged Wearry with capital murder, and the only 
evidence directly tying him to that crime was [prisoner] Scott’s dubious testimony, corroborated by 
the similarly suspect testimony of [prisoner] Brown.”); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 
(1963) (“A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made available, 
would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the 
defendant.”); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (“The jury’s estimate of the truthfulness 
and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon 
such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant’s life 
or liberty may depend.”). 
64. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (“When the ‘reliability of a given witness 
may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,’ nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility 
falls within this general [Brady] rule.” (citations omitted)). 
65. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 453–54 (1995); Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153. 
66. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. 
67. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). 
68. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676–77 (1985). Prosecutors may also be required to 
disclose their witness’s application for sentence commutation. See, e.g., Reutter v. Solem, 888 F.2d 
578, 581 (8th Cir. 1989) (“Here, the prosecution failed to inform the defense that the state’s key 
witness, Trygstad, had applied for sentence commutation and that when he gave his testimony at 
petitioner’s trial he already had been scheduled to appear before the parole board a few days later.”). 
69. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 684. 
70. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112–13 (holding that the prosecutor’s failure to disclose the victim-
witness’s criminal record, though relevant under Brady, nonetheless did not require disclosure 
because it was not material to the case); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.7(a)(vi) (2007) (“[T]he 
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this evidence need only be disclosed if it is material, even for a 
prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony.71 Furthermore, there are 
even fewer informant disclosure requirements if the case is not yet set 
for trial.72 
B. Ruiz and Plea Deals: The Ruiz Court’s Analysis Leaves Open 
Required Pre-Plea Deal Informant Disclosures for Exculpatory 
Evidence 
In Ruiz, the defendant, Angela Ruiz, refused to accept the 
government’s “fast track” plea bargain for illegally smuggling drugs.73 
Ruiz travelled from Mexico to the United States.74 Immigration agents in 
the United States found thirty kilograms—about sixty-five pounds—of 
marijuana in Ruiz’s luggage.75 Ruiz refused to accept the plea bargain 
that federal prosecutors offered her because they required her to waive 
her right to impeachment evidence about informants or other 
witnesses.76 Because Ruiz would not agree to this waiver, the 
government withdrew its offer.77 
Even without this agreement, Ruiz eventually pled guilty.78 The court, 
on the government’s recommendation, sentenced Ruiz to a harsher 
sentence than recommended for the plea deal sentence.79 Ruiz appealed 
her sentence.80 On appeal, she argued that she was entitled to this 
impeachment evidence before negotiating or accepting a plea.81 
The Ruiz Court ruled against her, saying that “the Constitution does 
not require the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence 
prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant.”82 But the 
                                                     
prosecuting attorney shall disclose to the defendant . . . any record of prior criminal convictions 
known to the prosecuting attorney.”). 
71. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678–80 (“[T]he knowing use of perjured testimony . . . is considered 
material unless failure to disclose it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
72. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 623 (2002). 
73. Id. at 625. 
74. United States v. Ruiz, 241 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’d, 536 U.S. 622 (2002). 
75. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 622. 
78. Id. at 626. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. See id. Ruiz’s appeal was under 18 U.S.C. § 3742, Review of a Sentence, which states in part 
that a “defendant may file a notice of appeal in the district court for review of an otherwise final 
sentence if the sentence . . . was imposed in violation of law.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1) (2012). 
82. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 623. 
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Court’s conclusion depended on whether Ruiz voluntarily, knowingly, 
intelligently, and with sufficient awareness waived her constitutional 
rights.83 It also depended on the difficulty in determining when this 
information is helpful to the accused and disrupting and severely 
burdening the government’s investigation.84 
Therefore, the Ruiz Court first held that impeachment information is 
special in relation to the fairness of trial and not with respect to plea 
deals if a plea is voluntary.85 The Court continued: “the law ordinarily 
considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the 
defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would 
likely apply in general in the circumstances—even though the defendant 
may not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking it.”86 
Second, the Court stated that it is difficult to characterize 
impeachment information as critical information that the accused must 
know before a plea deal because it is unknown if the information will or 
will not help the accused.87 The degree of help, the Court went on, 
depends on the accused’s independent knowledge of the prosecutor’s 
potential case.88 
Third, the Ruiz Court stated that the Constitution, with respect to the 
defendant’s awareness of the relevant circumstances, does not require 
complete knowledge.89 “It is difficult to distinguish, in terms of 
importance, (1) a defendant’s ignorance of grounds for impeachment of 
potential witnesses at a possible future trial from (2) the varying forms 
of ignorance at issue in these cases.”90 
Fourth, the Court said that due process considerations, which include 
the nature of the private interests at stake, the value of the additional 
safeguard, and the adverse impact of the requirement on the 
government’s interests, argue against a right to information in Ruiz’s 
case.91 
The Court stated that the added value of this safeguard was minimal 
because the value depends on the accused’s independent knowledge of 
                                                     
83. Id. at 633. 
84. Id. at 630–32. 
85. Id. at 629. 
86. Id. (emphasis in original). 
87. Id. at 630. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 631. 
91. Id. (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985)). 
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the government’s case.92 It also reasoned that “the Government will 
provide ‘any information establishing the factual innocence of the 
defendant regardless.’”93 And other additional safeguards, the Court 
said, such as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, would protect the 
defendant’s constitutional rights.94 The Court then said that the 
government’s interest in the efficient administration of justice, 
protecting witnesses, and not disrupting ongoing investigations weighed 
against a constitutional obligation to provide impeachment information 
before plea negotiations.95 
The Ruiz Court ruled that pre-plea impeachment evidence need not be 
disclosed. But there remains a split within the U.S. Courts of Appeals as 
to whether the government must turn over material exculpatory evidence 
before a guilty plea. The first section summarizes the Seventh Circuit’s 
position requiring such disclosure. The second section summarizes the 
Fifth Circuit’s opposing position. 
1. The Seventh Circuit’s Analysis Supports Pre-Plea Informant 
Disclosures that Align with Ruiz and Constitutional Due Process 
The Seventh Circuit, in 2003 in McCann v. Mangialardi96 addressed, 
in dicta, pre-plea informant disclosures in Ruiz and concluded the 
following: “[t]he Supreme Court’s decision in Ruiz strongly suggests 
that a Brady-type disclosure might be required under the circumstances 
of this particular case.”97 
Mangialardi involved a deputy chief police officer—Sam 
Mangialardi—participating in cocaine trafficking.98 One of 
Mangialardi’s traffickers suspected a person, former defendant and now 
plaintiff, Demetrius McCann, of being an informant.99 This trafficker 
planted drugs in McCann’s car.100 Mangialardi then ordered police to 
                                                     
92. Id. 
93. Id. The Court omitted the citation for their quotation. 
94. Id.; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3) (“Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court 
must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.” (emphasis added)); McCarthy v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969) (holding that under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, the 
judge must personally address the defendant and determine whether the defendant’s plea was 
voluntarily made with sufficient understanding). 
95. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631–32. 
96. 337 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2003). 
97. Id. at 787. 
98. Id. at 783. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
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search McCann’s car, where they found the drugs and arrested 
McCann.101 McCann later pled guilty to drug charges.102 
Regarding the importance of an informant’s testimony in the 
government’s case, the Seventh Circuit stated: 
Thus, Ruiz indicates a significant distinction between 
impeachment information and exculpatory evidence of actual 
innocence. Given this distinction, it is highly likely that the 
Supreme Court would find a violation of the Due Process Clause 
if prosecutors or other relevant government actors have 
knowledge of a criminal defendant’s factual innocence but fail 
to disclose such information to a defendant before he enters into 
a guilty plea.103 
The Mangialardi Court did not consider the pre-plea disclosure 
issue.104 This was because former defendant McCann failed to show that 
police deputy Mangialardi knew about the McCann’s factual innocence 
before McCann pled guilty.105 
Once more, in 2016 in Cairel v. Alderden,106 the Seventh Circuit 
reemphasized, again in dicta, potential pre-plea disclosure requirements: 
the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, even in the context of plea 
deals, may be an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty violating 
Brady.107 
However, since the former defendant in Cairel had access to the 
exculpatory information before pleading guilty, the Seventh Circuit did 
not consider pre-plea disclosures under Ruiz.108 There were two 
defendants in Cairel, one of whom, Jeremy Cairel, appeared to have a 
learning disability.109 After initially denying involvement, Cariel 
admitted to the robbery, and implicated his co-defendant, Marvin 
Johnson.110 Both men were eventually found innocent and released when 
                                                     
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 788. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. 821 F.3d 823 (7th Cir. 2016). 
107. Id. at 833. 
108. Id. at 833 n.3. 
109. Id. at 828–29. 
110. Id. at 828. 
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detectives found information supporting their innocence.111 Johnson said 
he pled guilty, despite his innocence, to avoid jail time.112 
2. The Fifth Circuit’s Reasoning Restricts Ruiz and Declines to 
Distinguish Between Impeachment Evidence and Exculpatory 
Evidence 
The Seventh Circuit’s analysis contrasts with the Fifth Circuit’s.113 In 
2009, in United States v. Conroy,114 the Fifth Circuit rejected the 
Seventh Circuit’s analysis, namely that the Ruiz Court’s limited 
discussion to impeachment evidence suggests that exculpatory evidence 
should be treated differently.115 The Fifth Circuit in Conroy ruled that 
“Ruiz never ma[de] such a distinction nor can this proposition be implied 
from its discussion.”116 
Then in 2017 in Alvarez v. City of Brownsville,117 a three judge panel 
on the Fifth Circuit affirmed Conroy.118 In Alvarez, the defendant was 
arrested for burglary and intoxication.119 At the jail, the detention officer 
accused the defendant Alvarez of assault.120 Alvarez pled guilty.121 
Several years later, video evidence surfaced showing Alvarez’s 
innocence.122 The panel of judges in Alvarez denied Alvarez’s Brady 
claim for damages: Alvarez did not have a constitutional right to this 
exculpatory evidence when he pleaded guilty.123 Additionally, the panel 
distinguished Alvarez as a case involving a Brady claim for civil 
damages, rather than a collateral attack on a guilty plea.124 
                                                     
111. Id. at 830. 
112. Id. 
113. See generally United States v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
114. 567 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
115. Id. at 179. 
116. Id. 
117. 860 F.3d 799 (5th Cir. 2017). 
118. Id. at 802–03. 
119. Id. at 800. 
120. Id.  
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 803. 
124. Id. Indeed, Alvarez’s conviction was overturned after the exculpatory video evidence 
surfaced. Id. 
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A few months later, in November 2017, the Fifth Circuit granted 
rehearing en banc.125 Their en banc decision is pending as of this 
Comment’s writing. 
The reasoning and analysis above lays the foundation for supporting a 
legal standard that sometimes requires the government to turn over 
exculpatory information relating to informants before plea negotiations. 
However, first, it is necessary to know whom these informants are, and 
what motives they have to lie. 
C. Brady Only Requires the Government Turn Over Limited 
Information About Incentivized Informants to the Accused 
There are several general types of incentivized informants in the 
American criminal justice system, each of which interacts differently 
with Brady’s progeny. These incentivized informants can loosely be 
categorized as: the jailhouse snitch, the professional snitch, the 
accomplice, the calumniator—one who falsely accuses others—and the 
confidential informant. 
1. The Jailhouse Snitch 
The jailhouse snitch126 is the prototypical incentivized informant.127 
Jailhouse snitches are in jail or prison. But, if they help law enforcement 
and prosecutors with a case, then they may receive a reduced sentence, 
money on the books, a better cell, cigarettes, clothes, or other services or 
privileges.128 And, if they are lucky, then they may even be released.129 
The jailhouse snitch is the most commonly recognized snitch, whose 
credibility is often at issue in many wrongful imprisonment cases 
involving incentivized informants.130 Jailhouse snitches will typically 
                                                     
125. Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 874 F.3d 898 (5th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
126. Jack Call, Legal Notes, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 73, 73 (2001) (“A jailhouse informant is an inmate 
who is either asked by the government to report any incriminating evidence shared with the inmate 
by another inmate or who comes forward on his or her own with such information. The government 
then agrees to give the informant some benefit in return for testifying against the targeted 
defendant.”). 
127. Once again, Leslie Vernon White in the 1980s stands out as an extreme example of a 
jailhouse snitch. He would call local police and prosecutors’ departments impersonating a state 
actor to gather information about a case and then use that information to create a false confession of 
a new incarcerated person awaiting trial. See Ted Rohrlich, Jail Informant Owns Up to Perjury in a 
Dozen Cases, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 4, 1990), http://articles.latimes.com/1990-01-04/news/mn-300_1_ 
murder-case [https://perma.cc/9NJQ-RT7A]; Rohrlich, supra note 11. 
128. NATAPOFF, supra note 50, at 28. 
129. Id. at 38. 
130. Id. 
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“overhear” detailed confessions or conversations from the accused, or 
claim the accused confessed to them while both were incarcerated.131 
Additionally, jailers and law enforcement sometimes recruit well-
known and helpful jailhouse snitches.132 Jailers may actively place 
jailhouse snitches in the same cell as, or adjacent to, a recently 
incarcerated individual who has not yet been convicted, or even 
charged.133 The snitch then claims to get guilt-probative information 
about the new prisoner, and provides this information to the jailers, law 
enforcement, or prosecutors.134 
Because of the usefulness of these statements, it is difficult for law 
enforcement and prosecutors to stop using this information altogether.135 
But it is important to learn more about jailhouse snitches. This includes 
learning about their criminal and testimonial history and their reasons 
and benefits for testifying. Such information would, if shared with 
prosecutors, the court, the defense, and jurors, give our adversarial 
system more rigor. It would also cause prosecutors to strongly 
                                                     
131. See C. Blaine Elliott, Life’s Uncertainties: How to Deal with Cooperating Witnesses and 
Jailhouse Snitches, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 1, 1 (2003) (discussing a case where a jailhouse informant 
testified against a defendant and later recanted and admitted to lying after the defendant was 
executed); Kevin D. Williamson, When District Attorneys Attack, NAT’L REV. (May 31, 2015, 4:00 
AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/419110/criminal-justice-mess-orange-county-kevin-d-
williamson [https://perma.cc/YR5Z-Y5WN] (“The database tracking inmates’ movements around 
the jail and the reason for those movements is significant, because Orange County law enforcement 
and prosecutors were in the habit of placing targeted suspects in proximity to criminal 
informants . . . .”). 
132. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE 1989–90 LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY: INVESTIGATION OF 
THE INVOLVEMENT OF JAIL HOUSE INFORMANTS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN LOS 
ANGELES COUNTY 37, 52–53 (1990) [hereinafter L.A. GRAND JURY REPORT], http://grandjury.co 
.la.ca.us/pdf/Jailhouse%20Informant.pdf [https://perma.cc/SS23-CHET] (describing how some 
high-profile suspects are placed in classified groups of jailhouse informants). Afterwards, the L.A. 
County District Attorney’s Office severely restricted the use of jailhouse informant testimony. 
Jailhouse testimony now requires “strong corroboration,” payments over $50 are prohibited, 
prosecutors must check an informant index, and prosecutors must obtain permission from a 
committee to use the informant. NATAPOFF, supra note 50, at 189–90. 
133. L.A. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 132, at 37. For a current look at the L.A. County 
District Attorney’s Office policies on Brady, see L.A. CTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, POLICIES, 
http://da.lacounty.gov/about/policies [https://perma.cc/DX4S-XYWP]. 
134. Call, supra note 126, at 83 (“Because jailhouse informants are already incarcerated, they are 
likely to feel that they have nothing to lose and much to gain by providing information to the 
government.”). 
135. For example, Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, in potentially reducing a 
defendant-informant’s sentence, while trying to prevent lying, reads in part: “information the 
usefulness of which could not reasonably have been anticipated by the defendant until more than 
one year after sentencing . . . .” FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b)(2)(C). 
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reexamine the reliability of a jailhouse informant.136 Under Brady, this 
information must be turned over if it is material, but sometimes even 
material information does not reach the jury.137 Often times this is 
because defendants strike a plea deal.138 
2. The Professional Snitch 
The professional snitch makes a career out of selling information.139 
And the government is often the buyer. As mentioned in the 
introduction, Andrews Chambers Jr. is an extreme example of a 
professional snitch.140 Chambers was a repeat player in the incentivized 
informant system.141 He gained the trust of his government handlers and 
profited immensely for his efforts.142 In sum, the professional snitch, like 
Chambers, has a constant presence in the incentivized informant system, 
and gains rewards for giving the government information about crimes 
                                                     
136. See, e.g., Kevin C. McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady Disclosure, and Wrongful Convictions, 
57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 651, 656 (2007) (“Failure to disclose exculpatory information at trial 
means jurors will render a decision without that information and thus be more likely to render an 
inaccurate verdict. But there is no jury at a guilty plea hearing.”). 
137. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83–85 (1963). A great problem arises when, unlike in 
Brady, there is a failure to appeal, or a plea deal. Then this information never reaches the jury or the 
court. Regarding the plea deal, see NATAPOFF, supra note 50, at 78 (discussing briefly the 
psychology of why innocent people may agree to a plea deal). 
138. Allana Durkin Richer & Curt Anderson, Trial or Deal? Some Driven to Plead Guilty, Later 
Exonerated, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 15, 2016), https://apnews.com/24cfa961d3444be49901496 
fdcaa3fda [https://perma.cc/9V6L-PKKH] (“Last year, more than 97 percent of criminal defendants 
sentenced in federal court pleaded guilty compared with about 85 percent more than 30 years ago, 
according to data collected by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. The increase in guilty 
pleas has been a gradual rise over the last three decades.”). 
139. See Joe Davidson, Want to Make a Million? Become a DEA Informant, WASH. POST  
(Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/09/30/want-to-make-
a-million-become-a-dea-informant/?utm_term=.07e9630eacf1 [https://perma.cc/K8BZ-YYYB]; 
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT OF THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT 
ADMINISTRATION’S MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF ITS CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE PROGRAM iv 
(2016) [hereinafter AUDIT OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE PROGRAM], https://oig.justice.gov/reports/ 
2016/a1633.pdf#page=1 [https://perma.cc/AT5A-HL9F] (“Additionally, we identified one source 
who was paid over $30 million during a 30-year period, some of it in cash payments of more than 
$400,000.”). 
140. Sorkin & Brasch Librach, supra note 2. 
141. Id. 
142. Id.; see also Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012) (stating that requests by 
third parties of informant records need not be disclosed unless the informant’s status as an informant 
has been officially confirmed); Bennett v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 55 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 1999) 
(involving FOIA request to the DEA for records pertaining to the informant Andrew Chambers). 
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and criminals.143 Snitches like Chambers are rewarded even if their 
information turns out to be false.144 
Under Brady’s progeny, an informant’s paid status is material for 
Brady purposes and must be disclosed.145 Yet Chambers is an example 
of what may happen despite Brady’s protections; the government gathers 
enough information from a professional snitch to convict a defendant 
only to find out later that this information was false.146 This type of 
snitch provokes the oft-asked question: how many of these informants 
provide testimony that no one discovers is fabricated?147 
3. The Accomplice 
The accomplice informant is a person who is the alleged accomplice 
of the defendant or the accused.148 Generally, the accomplice is someone 
who allegedly worked in concert with others to commit a crime.149 The 
accomplice takes loosely two forms.150 First, the accomplice could in 
fact be an accomplice, but inform on individuals who had nothing to do 
with the crime.151 Second, these accomplices may have been involved in 
                                                     
143. Lord, supra note 9. 
144. See, e.g., AUDIT OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE PROGRAM, supra note 139, at i (“In one case, 
the DEA reactivated a confidential source who previously provided false testimony in trials and 
depositions. During the approximate 5-year period of reactivation, this source was used by 13 DEA 
field offices and paid $469,158. More than $61,000 of the $469,158 was paid after this source was 
once again deactivated for making false statements to a prosecutor.”). 
145. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004). Banks involved a paid informant who told police 
that the defendant was involved in a murder and knew where the murder weapon was, and the court 
reversed the defendant’s conviction because the prosecution violated Brady by not turning over 
information that the informant was being paid by the government. Id. at 668, 691. 
146. Hensley & Nowicki, supra note 7. 
147. Davidson, supra note 139 (“The report by the Justice Department’s Office of Inspector 
General (IG) found serious deficiencies with the DEA’s confidential-source program, including 
poor oversight that ‘exposes the DEA to an unacceptably increased potential for waste, fraud, and 
abuse,’ IG Michael Horowitz said.”). 
148. Two classic examples of the accomplice informant are Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 
(1959), and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
149. See R. Michael Cassidy, “Soft Words of Hope:” Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, and the 
Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1129, 1134 (2004) (describing an accomplice 
as a “joint venturer in a crime”). 
150. While a person could theoretically pose as an accomplice when she was not involved in the 
crime at all, to lie and minimize others’ liability, she would subject herself to liability. So, this 
Comment disregards this option since no information could be found about how prevalent these 
informants are. But see People v. Gray, 408 N.E.2d 1150 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (convicting innocent 
woman of murder who lied in her testimony about several others’ involvement in the murder hoping 
for a reduced sentence). 
151. See, e.g., State v. Statler, 160 Wash. App. 622, 629–30, 248 P.3d 165, 169 (2011) (finding 
three later-exonerated men guilty based on informant testimony); State v. Gassman, 160 Wash. App. 
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the crime, but, for reasons of self-interest, inform on their fellow 
accomplices. These accomplices may also downplay their role in the 
crime while exaggerating the role of other participants.152 
The accomplice is a common type of informant used regularly by law 
enforcement and prosecutors.153 In a prisoners’ dilemma, these 
informants want to be as useful as possible to get the best deal for 
themselves.154 So, their incentives to provide good testimony—and lie 
while doing it—are strong.155 Thus, an accomplice’s background and 
reliability are important in assessing that accomplice’s testimony.156 
Brady covers an accomplice’s actual or expected benefits from the 
government, but this information does not always come to light.157 Nor 
does it cover accomplices’ self-preservation interests.158 
4. The Calumniator 
The calumniator passes blame to someone else. The calumniator is 
typically an informant who feigns innocence or downplays their 
involvement in a crime.159 The target of this blame could be a co-
                                                     
600, 606–08, 248 P.3d 155, 157–58 (2011) (same); State v. Larson, 160 Wash. App. 577, 583–85, 
249 P.3d 669, 672–73 (2011) (same). 
152. See, e.g., Napue, 360 U.S. at 264 (involving a murder suspect accomplice who downplayed 
his role by stating that he was a reluctant participant in the robbery that led to the victim’s murder). 
153. Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering Uncorroborated 
Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1528–29 (2008) (stating that 
accomplices often become a key witness against their other accomplices). 
154. For example, when the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 went into effect, it changed the 
incentives for defendants in federal prosecutions. Parole was eliminated and mandatory minimums 
were put in place. ETHAN BROWN, SNITCH: INFORMANTS, COOPERATORS & THE CORRUPTION OF 
JUSTICE 43 (2007) (“Cooperation thus became a necessity for many defendants looking to reduce 
their sentences.”); see also Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987, 
1989–90. 
155. Indeed, an informant can reduce his or her sentence in a federal proceeding by providing the 
federal government with “substantial assistance.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2012). 
156. See Sam Roberts, Should Prosecutors Be Required to Record Their Pretrial Interviews with 
Accomplices and Snitches?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 257, 285 n.222 (2005) (“[N]otoriously unreliable 
witnesses include identification witnesses, young children, and cooperating witnesses such as 
informants, accomplices, and so-called ‘snitches.’” (quoting Bennett L. Gershman, 
The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 343 (2001))). 
157. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (holding that nondisclosure and 
noncommunication of prosecutor’s promise to witness that he would not be prosecuted if he 
cooperated with the government—even though a different prosecutor who did not know about this 
promise tried the case—was a Brady violation). 
158. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 267 (1959). 
159. Trott, supra note 12, at 1383 (stating that a criminal’s willingness to get out trouble includes 
“lying, committing perjury, manufacturing evidence, soliciting others to corroborate their lies with 
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conspirator, a rival gang member, or an innocent person who was at the 
wrong place at the wrong time.160 The calumniator overlaps with some 
of the other informants defined in this section, but is distinguished by the 
desire to shift as much blame as possible onto another party, regardless 
of who that other party is.161 This informant is either responsible for the 
crime in question, or knows who is responsible, but decides to blame 
another person or persons who did not commit the crime.162 These 
informants are incentivized to blame others for the crime to reduce 
liability for themselves or for another person.163 
Unsurprisingly, this type of informant has been responsible for many 
wrongful convictions in America.164 Calumniators are one of the more 
difficult informants to deal with because their incentive, escaping 
liability, is not as discoverable a benefit as promises or expectations 
from the government.165 As such, under Brady, some useful information, 
                                                     
more lies, and double-crossing anyone with whom they come into contact including—and 
especially—the prosecutor”). 
160. See, e.g., State v. Statler, 160 Wash. App. 622, 630, 248 P.3d 165, 169 (2011). Statler was 
one of three men convicted for an armed robbery. All three were later exonerated after their counsel 
discovered that the informant’s testimony was not credible. The informant confessed to being 
involved in the crime in the case. 
161. Id. at 628–29. The informant in the case, Dunham, received a seventeen-month juvenile 
sentence. In exchange, the three men wrongfully imprisoned received a combined total of ninety-
nine years in prison. They were released several years after their convictions. Maurice Possley, Our 
Clients’ Stories of Innocence, UNIV. WASH. SCH. L. INNOCENCE PROJECT NW. CLINIC, 
http://www.law.washington.edu/clinics/ipnw/stories.aspx#gassman [https://perma.cc/V7 
FY-V9FV]; see also Statler, 160 Wash. App. at 630, 248 P.3d at 169. 
162. People v. Jimerson, 535 N.E.2d 889 (Ill. 1989). The defendant, Verneal Jimerson, was 
accused with three others, Dennis Williams, Kenneth Adams, and Willie Rainge, for a double 
murder. Id. at 891. They were convicted based in part on perjured incentivized informant testimony 
and later exonerated. Id. at 891, 909. See also Steve Mills, ‘Ford Heights Four’ Exonerated, but Not 
Free from Pasti, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 11, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-04-11/news/ct-
ford-heights-four-met-20140411_1_two-decades-ford-heights-four-northwest-indiana 
[https://perma.cc/5QN6-LWWD]. 
163. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 444 N.E.2d 136, 137 (Ill. 1982) (involving a witness who said 
that she was forced to lie about others involved in a rape and two murders); People v. Rainge, 445 
N.E.2d 535, 543 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (same); People v. Gray, 408 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1980) (same); Statler, 160 Wash. App. at 630, 248 P.3d at 169 (involving an informant—a 
defendant in a robbery case—who falsely accused three men as being his accomplices, to protect his 
friends who did commit the crime). 
164. See, e.g., People v. Burrows, 665 N.E.2d 1319, 1328 (Ill. 1996) (holding that granting 
defendant’s new trial was warranted after new evidence showed that primary witness in case 
admitted her trial testimony was perjured and that she alone killed the victim); Warden, supra note 
13, at 14 (assigning 45% of wrongful capital convictions to snitch testimony). 
165. Compare Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 267 (1959) (involving prosecutor’s failure to 
disclose promise not to prosecute witness), with Statler, 160 Wash. App. at 628, 248 P.3d at 168 
(involving defendant-informant’s desire to allow the real accomplices to remain free in addition to 
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such as criminal history—if it exists—may be required, as material, but 
it may not capture important incentives that this type of informant has.166 
5. The Confidential Informant 
The confidential informant is a form of witness whose testimony is 
used in court by law enforcement and prosecutors but whose identity 
remains hidden from the public and parties at trial.167 Allowing a witness 
to testify anonymously helps protect the informant from threats and 
harm, helps preserve the government’s investigation, and allows for the 
witness’s continued participation in the criminal justice system.168 
These confidential informants are major players in the incentivized 
informant system.169 Yet these informants’ background information—
name, testimonial history, criminal history, and much more—remain 
hidden to protect their identity.170 Troublingly, Andrew Chambers Jr. 
was a confidential informant for most of his cases.171 Confidential 
informants play an important role as bread-and-butter witnesses in some 
areas of criminal law, especially drug cases.172 
                                                     
getting a reduced sentence by telling the government that three later-exonerated men helped him 
commit the crime). 
166. See Statler, 160 Wash. App. at 628, 248 P.3d at 168. 
167. The U.S. Attorney General defines a confidential informant (CI), or as they put it a 
“confidential human source,” as anyone “who is believed to be providing useful and credible 
information to the FBI for any authorized information collection activity, and from whom the FBI 
expects or intends to obtain additional useful and credible information in the future, and whose 
identity, information or relationship with the FBI warrants confidential handling.” U.S. ATTORNEY 
GENERAL ALBERTO R. GONZALES, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES REGARDING THE USE 
OF FBI CONFIDENTIAL HUMAN SOURCES 4 (2006) [hereinafter AG INFORMANT GUIDELINES], 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/ag-guidelines-use-of-fbi-chs.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/376C-Y3MQ]; see also FLA. STAT. § 914.28 (2017) (defining confidential 
informant). 
168. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957) (“The problem is one that calls for 
balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to 
prepare his defense.”); see also Arthur L. Sr. Burnett, The Potential for Injustice in the Use of 
Informants in the Criminal Justice System, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 1079, 1085 (2008) (“A citizen must 
have the right to a hearing to endeavor to convince the decision maker that his apprehension and 
detention is the result of mistaken identity or outright fabrication and falsehood by one or more 
confidential informants in the intelligence gathering process.”). 
169. Lord, supra note 9. 
170. AG INFORMANT GUIDELINES, supra note 167, at 4. 
171. Wagner, supra note 1. 
172. ROBERT R. BLOOM, RATTING: THE USE AND ABUSE OF INFORMANTS IN THE AMERICAN 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 64–66 (2000). Indeed, confidential informants are used heavily outside of the drug 
context at the state and local level. See Law Enforcement Confidential Informant Practices: J. 
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security & Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 107 
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Because of the extra difficulties confidential informants pose, this 
Comment does not focus in-depth on changing the government’s use of 
this type of informant.173 But because information about confidential 
informants must be disclosed when necessary to prepare a defendant’s 
case, confidential informants remain a part of this overall discussion.174 
These five general types of informants lay the foundation to 
determine what information is needed to evaluate an incentivized 
informant’s credibility. In turn, all actors in the criminal justice system 
can use this information to assess an incentivized informant’s credibility 
before and during a trial.175 
But how did “snitching” develop in the American criminal justice 
system? Some countries, such as Canada, as well as several European 
                                                     
(2007), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg36784/html/CHRG-110hhrg36784.htm 
[https://perma.cc/AT9T-BL2F] (statement of Alexandra Natapoff, Professor of Law, Loyola Law 
School) (“Of course, only about 10 percent of all of our criminal justice system is Federal. Ninety 
percent is State. So, I agree with your proposition that data collection and guidance monitoring at 
the State and local level is of paramount importance.”). 
173. This Comment’s aim is to offer several solutions to the false incentivized informant 
testimony problem. While confidential informants are a large part of the informant system, see, e.g., 
AUDIT OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE PROGRAM, supra note 139, at i, this Comment will not try to re-
determine when the government should reveal information about its confidential informants. As 
Roviaro already states, there is a balancing between public interest and a defendant’s right to 
prepare his or her case. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60–62. This concept can readily be applied to the plea 
deal context before trial. However, requiring information about a confidential informant before a 
plea deal, as opposed to trial, may require the government to devote more resources to the early 
phases of cases. See also Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 697–98 (2004) (“The Court there [in 
Roviaro] stated that no privilege obtains ‘[w]here the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or of the 
contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an 
accused.’ . . . Accordingly, even though the informer in Roviaro did not testify, we held that 
disclosure of his identity was necessary because he could have ‘amplif[ied] or contradict[ed] the 
testimony of government witnesses.’” (citations omitted)). 
174. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62 (“We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure [of a 
confidential informant’s identity] is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing the 
public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare his 
defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular 
circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the 
possible significance of the informer’s testimony, and other relevant factors.”). 
175. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631 (2002) (“And in any case, as the proposed plea 
agreement at issue here specifies, the Government will provide ‘any information establishing the 
factual innocence of the defendant’ regardless. That fact, along with other guilty-plea safeguards, 
see Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11, diminishes the force of Ruiz’s concern that, in the absence of 
impeachment information, innocent individuals, accused of crimes, will plead guilty.” (emphasis 
added)). Note the facts of the case of Ruiz and the government’s agreement: (1) the defendant was 
caught with about sixty-five pounds of marijuana, and (2) the government promised to turn over any 
facts establishing innocence as a part of the plea deal agreement. Id. at 622. As will be discussed 
later in this Comment, there are certain situations, even under Ruiz, where informant impeachment 
information should be provided to establish the requisite “sufficient awareness” under the U.S. 
Constitution. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963). 
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nations, look at this type of incentivized informant testimony with great 
skepticism and disfavor.176 The next Part gives a brief history of 
snitching, and provides three modern examples of where this practice 
has gone awry.177 
II. AMERICA’S HISTORY OF SNITCHING: INCENTIVIZED 
INFORMANTS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
This Part first gives a brief history of snitching and incentivized 
informants in America. It then describes modern issues with incentivized 
informants, using three examples: the informant scandal in Orange 
County, California; the Statler cases from Washington State; and the 
issues with informant use in Clark County, Nevada. 
A. The Foundation, Development, and Rise of Snitches in American 
Criminal Cases 
One of the earliest recordings of a “snitching” case in the United 
States involved two brothers, Jesse and Stephan Boorn (the Boorn 
Brothers).178 In 1819, in Manchester, Vermont the Boorn Brothers were 
accused and convicted of murdering their brother-in-law, Russell 
Colvin.179 One of the Boorn Brothers, Jesse, was placed in a cell next to 
a known forger, Silas Merrill.180 Merrill testified at the Boorn Brothers’ 
                                                     
176. NATAPOFF, supra note 50, at 64 (“Well into the 1970s, ‘[t]hroughout most of continental 
Europe . . . virtually all these [undercover] techniques were viewed, even by police officials, as 
unnecessary, unacceptable, and often illegal.’ Today, many European countries engage in some 
form of these tactics, but to a lesser degree than does American law enforcement.” (citations 
omitted)). 
177. The examples are just three of many. And they represent a historical problem of informant 
use in the American criminal justice system. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 154, at 50 (“Mindful of 
the decades of abuses committed by Bulger and Flemmi’s FBI handlers, in early 2001 Attorney 
General Janet Reno issued sweeping new guidelines governing the use of informants. Reno’s 
guidelines addressed the FBI’s multiple failures in the Bulger case: agents were prohibited from 
making promises of immunity to informants, a Confidential Informant Review Committee was 
established to approve and monitor high-level informants, and it became a requirement that federal 
prosecutors be notified when an informant was under investigation.”). 
178. THE SNITCH SYSTEM, supra note 13, at 2. This is not to exclude the prominent use of spies 
during the Revolutionary War: George Washington employed intelligence networks during the 
Revolutionary War. DENNIS G. FITZGERALD, INFORMANTS, COOPERATING WITNESSES AND 
UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATIONS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LAW, POLICY, AND PROCEDURE 6 (2015). 
While an important source of early government intelligence gathering, these spy practices are only 
tangentially related to the modern use of informants in the American criminal justice system. 
179. THE SNITCH SYSTEM, supra note 13, at 2. 
180. Id. 
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trial that Jesse Boorn confessed to committing the murder to him.181 
Merrill was freed from jail for his testimony.182 The Boorn Brothers 
were sentenced to death.183 However, right before the Boorn Brothers 
were hanged, the alleged murder victim, Colvin, reappeared, alive, 
several states away in New Jersey.184 Merrill, it turned out, was a pioneer 
American jailhouse snitch. 
Several decades later during the American Civil War, from 1861 to 
1865,185 tens of thousands of Union and Confederate prisoners created 
ideal conditions for large-scale jailhouse snitching.186 Indeed, in addition 
to prisoners providing information to their captors, a sizable portion of 
these prisoners changed their allegiance after being imprisoned.187 And 
while by no means reflecting the modern snitch system, the presence of 
prisoner-informants, or “razorbacks,”188 in Civil War prisons 
demonstrates the core issue with snitches: an innate desire to appeal to 
authorities in power to gain more favorable treatment.189 
More than half a century later, after the Prohibition era of the 1920s 
and early 1930s, another surge in snitching occurred.190 The Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms switched its focus from enforcing 
                                                     
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Important Proclamations.; The Belligerent Rights of the Rebels at an End, N.Y. TIMES (May 
10, 1865), http://www.nytimes.com/1865/05/10/news/important-proclamations-belligerent-rights-
rebels-end-all-nations-warned-against.html [https://perma.cc/FYG8-429A]. 
186. Ovid Futch, Prison Life at Andersonville, in CIVIL WAR PRISONS 15 (William Best 
Hesseltine ed. 1972) (“He will do anything to win approval of those human beings in whose power 
he finds himself . . . . Considering the conditions that existed in the Andersonville [Confederate-run 
prison] stockade, it is not surprising that some prisoners turned informers.”). 
187. See PAUL J. SPRINGER & GLENN ROBINS, TRANSFORMING CIVIL WAR PRISONS: LINCOLN, 
LIEBER, AND THE POLITICS OF CAPTIVITY 59 (2014) (“The defection rate at Camp Lawton in 
Millen, Georgia was . . . 349 of a total of 9,698 prisoners [who] took the Confederate oath during 
late October and early November of 1864. This number fell just short of 4 percent of the camp 
population.”). 
188. LONNIE R. SPEAR, PORTALS TO HELL: MILITARY PRISONS OF THE CIVIL WAR 317 (1997) 
(“[R]azorback: A Judas; one who informed on fellow POWs [prisoners of war] for special 
privileges or treatment; a spy in the prison population who would inform the authorities of any plans 
or rumors of escapes.”). 
189. Call, supra note 126, at 73–74. 
190. See Oversight Hearings on Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Special Hearing: 
Department of the Treasury Nondepartmental Witnesses: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the 
Comm. on Appropriations, 96th Cong. 6, 200 (1979) (“The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms had its origin in enforcement of the alcohol taxation and later prohibition laws . . . . Some 
of the more serious abuses relating to entrapment involve informants of questionable character who 
were given incentives to entrap individuals.”). 
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Prohibition to using entrapment and informants for firearms 
enforcement.191 And over the next few decades, informant use would 
grow from an informal part of American law enforcement practices, to 
an integral part of the criminal justice system.192 
This growth of informant use exploded in the 1960s and 1970s with 
the expansion of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s anti-crime efforts 
and the “War on Drugs.”193 President Nixon’s declaration of the War on 
Drugs, and President Ronald Reagan’s reemphasis of this “war” created 
a then unprecedented expansion of the use of informants.194 This held 
especially true for the DEA.195 Informants also became an important part 
of efforts to fight organized crime, and, eventually the War on Terror.196 
But backlash also followed the increased use of incentivized 
informants.197 The rise of “no snitching” or anti-informant feelings 
across America soared when Congress began passing a flurry of anti-
crime bills throughout the 1980s and 1990s.198 These bills included the 
creation of mandatory minimums for drug offenders.199 These 
mandatories could be reduced through “substantial assistance,” creating 
large incentives for informants to testify.200 
Highlighting the anti-informant sentiment in the 1980s and 1990s, a 
longtime jailhouse snitch, Leslie Vernon White, admitted to reporters 
that he consistently provided law enforcement and prosecutors with false 
                                                     
191. See id. at 6–7, 200. 
192. FITZGERALD, supra note 178, at 1–2, 7–8. 
193. Id. at 1–2. 
194. See id. at 18; Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention 
and Control (June 17, 1971), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3048 [https://perma.cc/ 
S3BF-2TPK]; PAULA MALLEA, THE WAR ON DRUGS: A FAILED EXPERIMENT 34 (2014) (“In 1972, 
President Richard Nixon first declared a War on Drugs. Legislation produced harsher penalties and 
expanded the numbers of offences that could be prosecuted . . . . In 1986, under Ronald Reagan, the 
United States re-dedicated itself to the War on Drugs and passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act.”). 
195. See STEVEN WISOTSKY, BEYOND THE WAR ON DRUGS: OVERCOMING A FAILED PUBLIC 
POLICY 74 (1990). 
196. FITZGERALD, supra note 178, at 1–2, 23. 
197. See generally Law Enforcement Confidential Informant Practices: J. Hearing Before 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. & the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil 
Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1–2 (2007). 
198. BROWN, supra note 154, at 11. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. Those who provide “substantial assistance” get a “5k” motion from prosecutors—a term 
coming from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines—which reduces the cooperator’s sentence based on 
the guideline matrix. Id. 
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testimony.201 He lied to get benefits from the government.202 The story 
was hugely controversial and immediately caught the public’s 
attention.203 
Leslie Vernon White was a career criminal who provided false 
testimony in dozens of cases.204 White sometimes pretended to be a 
police officer during his time in prison to gather information about an 
incarcerated person’s case through the telephone.205 Then White would 
use this information to provide fabricated testimony about an 
incarcerated person to law enforcement and prosecutors.206 Because law 
enforcement and prosecutors believed that there was no other way for 
White to know about this information, they believed him.207 The 
information that White provided, such as the alleged location of the 
crime and people involved, corroborated information that supposedly 
only law enforcement and prosecutors had access to.208 White used this 
information to make up false stories about incarcerated people and 
prisoners awaiting trial.209 Prosecutors convicted numerous individuals 
based off of this information.210 
A subsequent grand jury proceeding following the fallout from 
White’s admissions led Los Angeles County to find jailhouse informant 
testimony inherently unreliable and place severe restrictions on the use 
of this type of testimony.211 
Even after the Leslie Vernon White scandal, and many other high-
profile informant scandals, incentivized informants continue to be a core 
                                                     
201. Robert Reinhold, California Shaken over an Informer, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 1989), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/02/17/us/california-shaken-over-an-informer.html 
[https://perma.cc/5HNX-F97F]. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. THE SNITCH SYSTEM, supra note 13, at 2. 
205. Rohrlich, supra note 127. 
206. Id. 
207. See id. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
210. Reinhold, supra note 201 (“Defense lawyers have compiled a list of 225 people convicted of 
murder and other felonies, some sentenced to death, in cases in which Mr. White and other jailhouse 
informers testified over the last 10 years in Los Angeles County.”). Other jurisdictions should not 
wait until a scandal of this magnitude or with this much publicity forces them to change their 
practices dealing with incentivized informants. 
211. See generally L.A. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 132. 
Surratt (Ready to Pub) 3/18/2018  9:53 PM 
550 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:523 
 
component of the American criminal justice system.212 The next section 
examines three current modern controversies involving incentivized 
informant testimony: Orange County, California; the Statler cases in 
Washington State; and Clark County, Nevada. These three controversies 
help show the current scope of issues with incentivized informant 
testimony. They also highlight the wide geographic range of these issues 
across America. 
B. Contemporary Snitching in America: Three Recent Controversies 
Showing How Incentivized Informants Continue to Be a Major 
Contributor to Wrongful Imprisonment 
This section outlines incentivized informant testimony in the modern 
context. It does so first by highlighting disclosure failures by the Orange 
County, California District Attorney’s Office and Sheriff’s Department. 
It then reviews the battle three men endured to get released from prison 
and receive compensation for being wrongfully convicted from false 
informant testimony in Washington State. Lastly, this section inspects 
prosecutors’ failures in Clark County, Nevada to keep their promise to 
track and disclose their informants.213 
1. Welcome to the O.C.: Informant Misuse in Orange County, 
California 
In late 2014, a scandal involving the Orange County District 
Attorney’s Office (OCDA) broke loose: members of the OCDA were 
caught lying about, hiding, and misusing their informants in criminal 
cases.214 
                                                     
212. See, e.g., State v. Larson, 160 Wash. App. 577, 595, 249 P.3d 669, 677 (2011) (involving 
three men who were convicted based on informant testimony but later found innocent and 
exonerated). 
213. Incentivized informant scandals are major issues in other regions in the U.S. as well, not just 
Orange County and Clark County. For example, Texas, which continues battling a huge wrongful 
conviction problem, passed a new law in June of 2017 to reform the use of jailhouse snitches. H.B. 
34, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017), https://legiscan.com/TX/text/HB34/id/1625182 [https:// 
perma.cc/Q5NY-AY6N] (requiring prosecutors to keep detailed records about the jailhouse 
informants that they use, including their criminal history, benefits received for testifying, and the 
nature of their testimony). This bill went into effect on September 1, 2017. Id.; see also Texas 
Cracks Down on the Market for Jailhouse Snitches, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2017), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2017/07/15/opinion/sunday/texas-cracks-down-on-the-market-for-jailhouse-snitches. 
html?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc/P9YR-QWTM] (“Texas, which has been a minefield of wrongful 
convictions—more than 300 in the last 30 years alone—passed the most comprehensive effort yet to 
rein in the dangers of transactional snitching.”). 
214. Further scandals continue to plague Orange County. See Sharyn Alfonsi, Informant Says He 
Was Planted in Orange County to Snitch, CBS NEWS (May 21, 2017), 
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Resisting court efforts to disclose informant information, on 
September 22, 2014, the OCDA dismissed attempted murder charges 
against Joseph Govey.215 It was the third time in three months that the 
same prosecutor, Tony Rackauckas, dropped murder charges after 
defense attorneys accused Rackauckas and the OCDA of improperly 
withholding jailhouse informant information.216 Earlier in June 2014, the 
superior court judge hearing Govey’s case, Judge Thomas Goethals, 
ordered Rackauckas to disclose a long-held list of jailhouse 
informants.217 Instead, to avoid disclosing the jailhouse informant list, 
Rackauckas opted to dismiss the attempted murder charges against 
Govey.218 
Then in early 2015, the controversy ballooned: Judge Goethals 
discharged the entire OCDA from accused mass-murderer Scott 
Dekraai’s case.219 In 2014, Dekraai pled guilty to eight charges of first-
degree murder and was eligible for the death penalty.220 There was little 
doubt about Dekraai’s guilt, but the OCDA refused to comply with 
Judge Goethals’ order to turn over jailhouse informant evidence to 
Dekraai’s defense counsel.221 In response to the OCDA’s refusal, Judge 
Goethals found that the OCDA violated Dekraai’s constitutional rights, 
including his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser.222 The 
judge then removed all 250 OCDA prosecutors from Dekraai’s case.223 
The Orange County Sheriff’s Department (OCSD) fueled Judge 
Goethals’s decision to remove all OCDA prosecutors from Drekaai’s 
case.224 The OCSD took nearly four years to turn over jailhouse 
                                                     
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/informant-says-he-was-planted-in-orange-county-jail-to-snitch/ 
[https://perma.cc/2C5J-PAZA]; Williamson, supra note 131. 
215. Rex Dalton, More Murder Charges Dropped in Wake of DA Informants Case, VOICE OC 
(Sept. 30, 2014), http://voiceofoc.org/2014/09/more-murder-charges-dropped-in-wake-of-da-inform 
ants-case/ [https://perma.cc/9W4U-CDJR]. Govey had a criminal record at the time that the charges 
were filed. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. See id. 
219. Christopher Goffard, Orange County D.A. Is Removed from Scott Dekraai Murder Trial, 
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2015, 6:55 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/orangecounty/la-me-jailhouse-
snitch-20150313-story.html [https://perma.cc/SS8M-N36Z]. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
224. Christopher Goffard, Stakes Rise in Jailhouse Informant Case as Judge Blasts O.C. Sheriff, 
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2016, 9:35 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-ln-oc-jail-
snitch-scandal-20161216-story.html [https://perma.cc/FW8S-P7WK]. 
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informant information in Drakaai’s case.225 When the OCSD finally 
turned over this information, it was heavily redacted.226 The OCSD also 
denied having a jail informant program, a statement later contradicted by 
“Special Handling” documents about jailhouse informants revealed 
during discovery.227 
Next, after a hearing in Drakaai’s case, Santa Ana Assistant Public 
Defender Scott Sanders revealed that the OCSD maintained a secret 
twenty-five-year-old computerized database on informants with 
potentially exculpatory information.228 During a 2015 hearing, Judge 
Goethals found that two members of the OCSD intentionally lied or 
willfully withheld information in the Drakaai case.229 
Judge Goethals expressed his dismay at the scandal: “[i]t apparently 
stems from [Rackauckas’] loyalty to his law enforcement partners at the 
expense of his other constitutional and statutory obligations.”230 
One year later, Judge Goethals overturned Henry Rodriguez’s murder 
conviction, another high-profile OCDA case.231 The judge found the 
government’s use of jailhouse informants troubling and that it 
potentially violated Rodriguez’s Sixth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.232 
As the Orange County informant scandal received national scrutiny, 
in late 2016, the U.S Department of Justice (DOJ) launched a civil rights 
investigation of both the OCDA and the OCSD.233 The Los-Angeles-
based DOJ announced the investigation at the end of 2016 after defense 
attorneys made allegations that the OCDA violated several defendants’ 
rights by using informants to gather evidence in secret.234 
                                                     
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. Dahlia Lithwick, You’re All Out: A Defense Attorney Uncovers a Brazen Scheme to 
Manipulate Evidence, and Prosecutors and Police Finally Get Caught, SLATE (May 28, 2015, 1:38 
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/05/orange_county_prose 
cutor_misconduct_judge_goethals_takes_district_attorney.html [https://perma.cc/R6E2-QM8C]. 
229. Goffard, supra note 219. 
230. Id. 
231. Scott Moxley, OC Judge Overturns Murder Conviction Because of Prosecution Cheating, 
OC WEEKLY (Feb. 25, 2016, 1:29 PM), http://www.ocweekly.com/news/oc-judge-overturns-
murder-conviction-because-of-prosecution-cheating-6999292 [https://perma.cc/89E5-M2LF]. 
232. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
233. Kelly Puente & Tony Saavedra, Feds Launch Investigation into Orange County D.A.’s 
Office, Sheriff’s Department over Jailhouse Informants, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Dec. 16, 2016, 
1:11 PM), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/-738533.html [https://perma.cc/MR7S-UN7M]. 
234. Id. 
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The DOJ’s investigation is ongoing in 2018 as of this Comment’s 
writing and remains in its preliminary stages.235 Regardless of the DOJ’s 
results, the incentivized informant scandal in Orange County, California 
demonstrates the greater need for guidelines, laws, and rules that control 
how the government uses these informants. 
2. Snitch Deal: A Fight for Freedom and Just Compensation in the 
Statler Cases 
Paul Statler,236 Robert Larson, and Tyler Gassman were convicted of 
first-degree robbery, two counts of first-degree assault, and two counts 
of drive-by shooting in February of 2009.237 Their convictions came 
from a drug-related event in 2008 in Spokane Valley, Washington.238 
The Statler cases239 began in 2008 when five men, including Anthony 
Kongchunki and Matthew Dunham, robbed two males in an OxyContin 
drug transaction.240 One or more of the robbers fired shots as they fled 
the scene.241 Later that same month, Kongchunki and Dunham were 
arrested for a different robbery.242 After investigating the 2008 robbery, 
law enforcement learned that the shotgun used in that robbery was 
                                                     
235. Id. However, in the interim, the State Bar of California recently recommended suspending a 
prosecutor at the OCDA for at least one year. See Matt Ferner, State Bar Recommends Suspension 
of Orange County Prosecutor for Withholding Evidence, HUFFPOST (Oct. 12, 2017, 5:53 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/state-bar-recommends-suspension-of-orange-county-prosecu 
tor-for-withholding-evidence_us_59dfadace4b04d1d518046ed [https://perma.cc/3S9T-X773]. The 
State Bar of California found that this prosecutor willfully withheld material exculpatory evidence 
from a defendant during a criminal child abuse case. Id. And at a 2013 hearing to address the 
prosecutor’s failure to turn over Brady evidence, the prosecutor indicated that she would withhold 
the information again. See id.; Sandra Lee Nassar, A Member of the State Bar, No. 199305, 14-O-
00027-YDR (State Bar of Cal. Oct. 10, 2017), http://members.calbar.ca.gov/courtDocs/14-O-
00027.pdf [https://perma.cc/56R2-WRU9] (finding by clear and convincing evidence that OCDA 
prosecutor suppressed evidence which violated Brady and recommending bar suspension). 
236. Maurice Possley, Paul E. Statler, NAT’L REGISTRATION EXONERATIONS (July 26, 2013), 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4233 [https://perma. 
cc/GRN7-W9N2] [hereinafter Statler, NRE]. 
237. Larson v. State, 194 Wash. App. 722, 729, 375 P.3d 1096, 1101 (2016), review denied, 186 
Wash. 2d 1025, 385 P.3d 117 (2016). 
238. See Statler, NRE, supra note 236. 
239. Even though this incident involved three men, Statler, Larson, and Gassman, who were 
wrongfully convicted in three separate but related cases, common local usage refers to their three 
criminal cases as the “Statler cases.” So, this Comment follows that usage. 
240. Larson, 194 Wash. App. at 726–27, 375 P.3d at 1098–99. 
241. Id. at 727, 375 P.3d at 1099. 
242. Id. 
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located at Paul Statler’s home.243 Law enforcement searched Statler’s 
home and found the shotgun there.244 
Meanwhile, Kongchunki and Dunham sat in the Spokane County jail 
for one month, where, given ample time to craft a consistent story 
together, they told police that Statler, Larson, and Gassman were 
involved in the robberies.245 But when the government declined to offer 
Kongchunki a non-prison sentence, he recanted his story and said that 
none of the three other men—Paul Statler, Robert Larson, and Tyler 
Gassman—participated in the robberies.246 Detective Marske, the 
investigating officer, responded ominously to Kongchunki’s recantation: 
lying at trial is perjury.247 So, only Dunham248 testified against Statler, 
Larson, and Gassman.249 Dunham received a reduced sentence of 
seventeen months of confinement in a juvenile detention facility.250 In 
exchange, the three men received a combined ninety-nine year 
sentence.251 Statler was sentenced to forty-one years in prison, Gassman 
thirty-eight years, and Larson twenty years.252 
In 2012, three years after Statler, Larson, and Gassman were 
convicted, Spokane County Superior Court Judge Michael J. Price 
dismissed their 2009 convictions for robbery, assault, and drive-by 
                                                     
243. Id. 
244. Id. at 727–28, 375 P.3d at 1099–1100. 
245. Id. at 728, 375 P.3d at 1100. 
246. Id.; see also Kip Hill, Wrongful Imprisonment Claims Fail Before Spokane Judge, 
SPOKESMAN-REV. (Feb. 17, 2015, 4:23 PM), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2015/feb/17/ 
imprisoned-men-lose-lawsuit-against-state/ [https://perma.cc/QYB5-YPRG] (describing how the 
initial lawsuit involving Statler, Larson, and Gassman for their wrongful imprisonment claims 
failed). 
247. Larson, 194 Wash. App. at 728, 375 P.3d at 1100. 
248. It is worth noting that Dunham implicated Statler, Larson, and Gassman in four different 
cases, and it was only in one of these cases that a court found the trio guilty. See State v. Statler, 160 
Wash. App. 622, 630, 248 P.3d 165, 169 (2011); State v. Larson, 160 Wash. App. 577, 595, 249 
P.3d 669, 677 (2011); State v. Gassman, 160 Wash. App. 600, 607, 248 P.3d 155, 158 (2011). 
249. Larson, 194 Wash. App. at 728, 375 P.3d at 1100. 
250. Id. at 728–29, 375 P.3d at 1100–01. 
251. Statler, 160 Wash. App. at 630, 248 P.3d at 169; Possley, supra note 161. 
252. Statler, 160 Wash. App. at 630, 248 P.3d at 169; Larson, 160 Wash. App. at 595, 249 P.3d 
at 677; Gassman, 160 Wash. App. at 607, 248 P.3d at 158; see also State v. Gassman, 175 Wash. 2d 
208, 210, 283 P.3d 1113, 1114 (2012) (holding that Washington Appeals Court abused its discretion 
when imposing sanctions on the state for careless actions in prosecuting Gassman’s case because 
there was no showing that the state intentionally acted in bad faith while prosecuting Gassman); 
Possley, supra note 161. 
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shooting.253 Judge Price dismissed the case, citing doubts about the 
witness Dunham based on post-conviction evidence.254 The government 
originally promised to re-try Statler, Larson, and Gassman, but finally 
dismissed their charges in 2013.255 
The trio later filed for compensation for wrongful conviction in 2014 
under Washington State’s Wrongly Convicted Persons Act.256 In 2014, 
the Washington State Court of Appeals denied their request for 
compensation.257 However, the Washington State Court of Appeals 
reversed the denial in 2016 and remanded the case for the trial court to 
decide whether the trio was “actually innocent” by clear and convincing 
evidence.258 In April 2017 all three men were awarded under 
Washington’s wrongful compensation statute.259 They were found 
“actually innocent” of the crimes that they served over three years in 
prison for.260 
The Statler cases are an example of the accomplice and calumniator 
informants defined earlier in this Comment. Dunham, the incentivized 
informant in the Statler cases, testified not only to get a reduced 
sentence, but also to protect three of his accomplices.261 The other 
accomplice’s (Kongchunki) recantation was excluded from the initial 
                                                     
253. Thomas Clouse, Judge Throws Out Robbery Convictions: Three Men Freed After Four 
Years in Custody, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Dec. 15, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.spokesman.com/ 
stories/2012/dec/15/judge-throws-out-robbery-convictions/ [https://perma.cc/969V-YTPE]. 
254. Id. 
255. See Triple Exoneration: Charges Dismissed Against Three Men Wrongly Imprisoned on 
Testimony of Informant, UNIV. WASH. SCH. L. (Apr. 12, 2013), https://www.law.uw.edu/news/ 
2013/ipnwtripleexoneration/ [https://perma.cc/C5ZQ-M246]. 
256. Larson v. State, 194 Wash. App. 722, 375 P.3d 1096 (2016), review denied, 186 Wash. 2d 
1025, 385 P.3d 117 (2016); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 4.100.060(1)(c)(ii) (2016) (allowing 
compensation for wrongful imprisonment after showing by clear and convincing that the claimant 
did not commit the crime or crimes). 
257. See Larson, 194 Wash. App. 722, 375 P.3d 1096.  
258. Id. at 725, 375 P.3d at 1098. 
259. Spokane County Superior Court Enters Order Awarding Compensation for Wrongful 
Convictions, TERRELL MARSHALL L. GROUP PLLC (Apr. 13, 2017), http://terrellmarshall.com/ 
spokane-court-awards-compensation-wrongful-convictions/ [https://perma.cc/RY9H-GQ8W] (“This 
was the first case ever tried under Washington’s wrongful conviction compensation statute, chapter 
4.100 RCW.”); see also Nina Culver, Spokane County’s Insurer Offers $2.25 Million Settlement to 
Three Men Wrongfully Convicted of Robbery, SPOKESMAN-REV. (June 7, 2017, 10:20 PM), 
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2017/jun/07/spokane-countys-insurer-offers-225-million-
settlem/ [https://perma.cc/PQE3-6AE6] (describing how Statler, Larson, and Gassman received a 
settlement for their wrongful imprisonment after suing under Washington’s wrongful conviction 
compensation statute). 
260. Culver, supra note 259. 
261. Larson, 194 Wash. App. at 728–29, 375 P.3d at 1100–01. 
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case, but later used to discredit Dunham’s testimony at the post-
sentencing phase.262 
3. Clark County Prosecutors Break Their Promise to Track and 
Record Their Use of Informants263 
In 2008, facing a law mandating that prosecutors in Nevada maintain 
a database on their use of informants, the Clark County District 
Attorney’s Office (CCDAO) promised to maintain this database in lieu 
of legislation.264 That year, on June 9, a Nevada-based criminal defense 
association, the Nevada Attorneys for Criminal Justice (NACJ),265 
approached the Nevada Legislature’s Advisory Committee on the 
Administration of Justice.266 A representative of the NACJ, Assistant 
Federal Public Defender Lori Teicher, discussed a proposal for reducing 
false informant testimony.267 Teicher suggested that the Nevada State 
Legislature pass a bill requiring prosecutors to maintain a database of 
their informants and promises that prosecutors knew were made to these 
informants.268 
Clark County District Attorney Christopher J. Lalli responded: there 
were informal mechanisms in place for tracking witness-informants and 
Lalli’s organization was creating a formal policy for tracking the 
                                                     
262. See generally Larson, 194 Wash. App. 722, 375 P.3d 1096. 
263. Dameon Pesanti, Inside Information: Cops Use Confidential Informants to Go Where They 
Can’t, CHRON. (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.chronline.com/crime/inside-information-cops-use-
confidential-informants-to-go-where-they/article_09cdf67e-7a02-11e5-9758-5f374b9ca0a0.html 
[https://perma.cc/FVD3-EALG]; Ken Ritter, ‘Surreal’ Feeling for Nevada Man Freed After 23 
Years, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 30, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-surreal-feeling-for-
las-vegas-man-freed-after-23-years-2017-6 [https://perma.cc/6EHQ-ZA74]. 
264. Bethany Barnes, DA Criminal Informant Safeguard Rarely Used in Clark County, Records 
Suggest, LAS VEGAS REV. J. (Mar. 13, 2016, 9:57 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/las-
vegas/da-criminal-informant-safeguard-rarely-used-clark-county-records-suggest [https://perma.cc/ 
6TQT-657D]. 
265. ADVISORY COMM. ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, NEV. STATE LEG., MINUTES OF THE 
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 15 (2008), https://www.leg.state. 
nv.us/Session/74th2007/Interim_Agendas_Minutes_Exhibits/Minutes/AdminJustice/IM-Admin 
Justice-060908-10118.pdf [https://perma.cc/CN5Z-87HP] [hereinafter NEVADA LEG. JUNE 9, 2008 
MINUTES] (statement of Lori Teicher). The NACJ is affiliated with the National Association of 
Criminal of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NADCL). 
266. ADVISORY COMM. ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, NEV. STATE LEG., MINUTES OF THE 2015-
2016 INTERIM ADVISORY COMMISSION ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 14 (2016), 
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/InterimCommittee/REL/Document/6844 [https://perma.cc/NYF8-
H5F7] [hereinafter NEVADA LEG. 2016 INTERIM MINUTES]. 
267. NEVADA LEG. JUNE 9, 2008 MINUTES, supra note 265, at 15 (statement of Lori Tiecher). 
268. Id. 
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issue.269 Then, during another meeting with the Committee on the 
Administration of Justice on July 7, 2008, Lalli said that legislation was 
not necessary to mandate maintaining internal informant databases.270 
Lalli mentioned an informant database, including an inducement index 
that the neighboring Churchill County District Attorney’s Office 
implemented.271 He said that the CCDAO would also create and 
maintain a database of informants and the promises made to them.272 
Yet five years later in 2013, the database had a mere 130 entries, an 
alarmingly low figure given that the CCDAO prosecuted over 33,000 
criminal cases between 2008 and 2013.273 In response, the Committee on 
the Administration of Justice met again on June 14, 2016 to address the 
informant issue.274 At this meeting, the Commission concluded that “[i]t 
does not seem that voluntary adoptions of these [informant database] 
polices and implementation is really happening effectively.”275 After 
eight years of the CCDAO’s failure to implement an informant database 
system, the Commission once again started considering statutory 
requirements.276 
Also at the June 14, 2016 meeting, the Rocky Mountain Innocence 
Center Innocence Project presented an “Innocence Protections Proposal” 
to the Nevada State Advisory Commission on the Administration of 
Justice.277 The Rocky Mountain Innocence Center’s presentation 
reemphasized the need for an informant database.278 It also suggested 
                                                     
269. Id. at 16 (statement of Christopher J. Lalli). 
270. ADVISORY COMM. ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, NEV. STATE LEG., MINUTES OF THE 
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 17 (2008), https://www.leg.state.nv. 
us/74th/Interim_Agendas_Minutes_Exhibits/Minutes/AdminJustice/IM-AdminJustice-070708-
10118.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PPP-VLCD] [hereinafter NEVADA LEG. JULY 7, 2008 MINUTES] 
(statement of Christopher J. Lalli). 
271. Id. at 17–19. “Inducement index” means a record of the promises made to informants in 
exchange for their testimony. Id. 
272. Id. 
273. Barnes, supra note 264; see also The Law Offices of Jeffrey Jaeger, Use of Confidential 
Informants in Clark County Remains Murky Issue, FACEBOOK (June 14, 2016), 
https://www.facebook.com/notes/the-law-offices-of-jeffrey-jaeger-chtd/use-of-confidential-inform 
ants-in-clark-county-remains-murky-issue/1736429003299757/ [https://perma.cc/58ZY-FLC5] 
(lamenting the CCDAO’s failure to track informants in a database). 
274. See NEVADA LEG. 2016 INTERIM MINUTES, supra note 266, at 1. 
275. Id. at 14. 
276. Id. 
277. ROCKY MOUNTAIN INNOCENCE CTR. INNOCENCE PROJECT, INNOCENCE PROTECTIONS 
PROPOSAL PRESENTED TO THE NEVADA STATE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE 1 (2016), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/InterimCommittee/REL/Document/4361 [https:// 
perma.cc/7HNE-SJFF]. 
278. Id. at 5. 
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statutes mandating: (1) pretrial disclosure of the prosecution’s intent to 
use an informant, and (2) requiring corroboration for all informant 
testimony.279 And, most importantly, the Rocky Mountain Innocence 
Center noted that the CCDAO failed to adequately maintain an 
informant database, suggesting that a voluntary adoption policy was not 
effective.280 
Then, on November 1, 2016, the Commission on the Administration 
of Justice met again to discuss the informant database issue.281 They had 
several agenda proposals for the issue, including requiring every Nevada 
State prosecutor’s office, not just Clark County’s, to track informant use 
through databases.282 And in February of 2017, the Commission issued a 
Final Report discussing draft legislation recommendations for informant 
databases in Nevada.283 These recommendations included establishing a 
legislative study on the use of “criminal justice information sharing” 
systems and “encouraging all criminal justice stakeholders” to work 
together to create “a statewide criminal justice information sharing 
database.”284 
Finally, the Nevada Senate Committee on Judiciary passed Senate 
Bill 277 to fund a study about integrating criminal justice information 
systems for informant use.285 The bill created a subcommittee that will 
review criminal justice information systems and determine how to 
integrate such a system statewide.286 As of January 2018, this 
                                                     
279. Id. 
280. Id. 
281. ADVISORY COMM. ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, NEV. STATE LEG., MEETING NOTICE AND 
AGENDA 1 (2016), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/InterimCommittee/REL/Document/9455 
[https://perma.cc/3XFQ-CBJ6]. 
282. Id. at 18–19. There were some other recommendations, including pre-trial reliability 
hearings by the judge, as well as jury instructions warning about an informant’s reliability. Id. at 19. 
283. ADVISORY COMM. ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, NEV. STATE LEG., FINAL REPORT 2–3 
(2017), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/InterimCommittee/REL/Document/9887 [https://perma.cc/ 
3XFQ-CBJ6]. 
284. Id.; see also CLARK COUNTY, SCOPE OVERVIEW, https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/Interim 
Committee/REL/Document/9095 [https://perma.cc/5TLG-DMGA] (encouraging Clark County 
officials to create and maintain an informant database). 
285. See S.B. 277, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2017), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS/ 
REL/79th2017/Bill/5238/Overview [https://perma.cc/P3VY-GW78]. 
286. Id. § 1.3. This subcommittee is called the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Information 
Sharing of the Commission. Id.; see also Jeff Schied, Democrats Advance Criminal Justice Agenda, 
in Tempered Form, NEV. INDEP. (June 18, 2017, 2:10 AM), https://thenevadaindependent.com/art 
icle/democrats-advance-criminal-justice-agenda-in-tempered-form [https://perma.cc/A4ED-3W27] 
(“The subcommittee will be authorized to appoint working groups and make recommendations for 
changes in criminal justice information policies. The bill, sponsored by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, passed unanimously out of both houses. It was approved by the governor on May 24.”). 
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subcommittee has not met.287 But its eventual meeting and review of 
criminal information sharing will shape the future for how informants 
are handled in Nevada. It may also serve as a model for all U.S. states. 
America has used incentivized informants in criminal proceedings 
from its founding years until today.288 Since then, as the criminal justice 
system grew, informant use exploded.289 The three ongoing issues in 
Orange County, California, Washington State, and Clark County, 
Nevada show that incentivized informants remain a major concern for 
wrongful imprisonment. These issues also show that American states are 
struggling to address false informant testimony.290 To solve this 
problem, a variety of approaches are needed. 
III. HOW TO REDUCE FALSE IMPRISONMENT CAUSED BY 
INCENTIVIZED INFORMANTS: PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
An informant’s purpose is to help the government convict a guilty 
criminal, not an innocent person. 291 This Part suggests several solutions 
to help reduce wrongful imprisonment from false incentivized informant 
testimony.292 
There are a variety of ways to reduce the problems with incentivized 
informant testimony.293 This Comment offers solutions that can be used 
alone or combined with one another. It first suggests how to identify and 
define “incentivized informant.” Next, it suggests ways that state and 
local governments can improve informant use. These solutions include 
statutes, court rules, and other rules and guidelines to guide local 
                                                     
287. See Advisory Committee on Nevada Criminal Justice Information Sharing, NEV. STATE 
LEG., https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/InterimCommittee/REL/Interim2015/Committee/268/Over 
view [https://perma.cc/PJK3-GQY5]. 
288. THE SNITCH SYSTEM, supra note 13, at 2. 
289. FITZGERALD, supra note 178, at 1–2, 7–8. 
290. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 264 (reporting that the CCDAO was rarely updating their 
informant database despite their promises to do so). 
291. “A prosecutor who does not appreciate the perils of using rewarded criminals as witnesses 
risks compromising the truth-seeking mission of our criminal justice system.” United States v. 
Bemal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). For a great discussion about 
prosecutors’ use of incentivized informants, see Trott, supra note 12, at 1432. 
292. While much of this Comment’s focus is on prosecutors, law enforcement also plays a huge 
role in the incentivized informant system. See STATE’S DUTY TO DISCLOSE EXCULPATORY 
MATERIAL EXTENDED BEYOND INDIVIDUAL PROSECUTOR ASSIGNED TO CASE, 20 NO. 10 CRIM. 
PRAC. REP. 3 (2006) (“Unknown to the prosecuting attorney, for the past 10 years the snitch had 
been a police informant for the local police department and even had his own confidential informant 
number.” (citing Maryland v. Williams, 896 A.2d 973 (Md. 2006))). 
293. See generally NATAPOFF, supra note 50. 
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governments on their use of incentivized informants. And finally, this 
Comment identifies a pre-plea deal legal standard for informant 
disclosure under Ruiz in light of a circuit split among the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals. 
A. Identifying and Defining Incentivized Informants: How 
Legislatures, Courts, and Other Governmental Actors Should 
Frame the Informant Issue 
The first step to reduce false incentivized informant testimony is to 
define “incentivized informant.” The second step is to decide what 
information affects these informants’ credibility and should be collected 
and turned over to the accused and to the court. Legislatures, courts, and 
government actors in turn can use this information to propose various 
solutions to the incentivized informant issue. 
1. “Incentivized Informant” Is a Witness Who Testifies in Exchange 
for a Benefit 
The definition of “incentivized informant” determines the scope and 
effect that a solution, such as a statute or court rule, has on reforming 
informant use.294 An incentivized informant is a witness who has an 
incentive to testify on behalf of the government.295 The term has two 
parts: “incentivized” and “informant.” 
a. Government Actors Should Define “Incentive” as Certain Benefits 
Offered to Witnesses 
An incentive is a reason or motivation for doing something.296 In the 
informant context, this could be to escape criminal liability, obtain a 
reduced sentence, receive money, prevent friends or accomplices from 
being incarcerated, as well as myriad other reasons to testify for the 
government.297 How “incentive” or similar terms like “benefit” or 
                                                     
294. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21 (2017) (“For the purposes of this Section, 
‘informant’ means someone who is purporting to testify about admissions made to him or her by the 
accused while incarcerated in a penal institution contemporaneously.”). 
295. See E.S.S.B. 5038, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017). 
296. See, e.g., id. (“‘Benefit’ means any deal, payment, promise, leniency, inducement, or other 
advantage offered by the state to an informant in exchange for his or her testimony, information, or 
statement”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21 (“any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit that the 
offering party has made or will make in the future to the informant”). 
297. NATAPOFF, supra note 50, at 28. 
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“inducement” are defined dictates what information the government 
must collect and disclose to the accused and the court.298 
Academics and state legislatures have defined “incentive” several 
different ways.299 For example, a bill proposed in the Washington State 
Legislature in the 2017 legislative session, Engrossed Substitute Senate 
Bill (ESSB) 5038, defined “benefit”—analogous to “incentive”—as the 
following: 
“Benefit” means any deal, payment, promise, leniency, 
inducement, or other advantage offered by the state to an 
informant in exchange for his or her testimony, information, or 
statement, but excludes a court-issued protection order. 
“Benefit” also excludes assistance that is ordinarily provided to 
both a prosecution and defense witness to facilitate his or her 
presence in court including, but not limited to, lodging, meals, 
travel expenses, or parking fees.300 
ESSB 5038 limited the definition of incentives to those benefits 
promised by or expected from the government. Yet this definition does 
not capture other incentives that a witness might have to lie, such as 
escaping criminal liability or preventing a friend or family member from 
being incarcerated.301 The government cannot know every benefit that an 
informant expects. But the government can—and should—know about 
promises that it makes to an informant.302 
                                                     
298. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21 (requiring the government to disclose a jailhouse 
informant’s testimonial history, promises made by the offering party, any recantations by the 
informant, and other information bearing on the informant’s credibility); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1127a 
(West 2017) (“For purposes of subdivision (c), ‘consideration’ means any plea bargain, bail 
consideration, reduction or modification of sentence, or any other leniency, benefit, immunity, 
financial assistance, reward, or amelioration of current or future conditions of incarceration in return 
for, or in connection with, the informant’s testimony in the criminal proceeding in which the 
prosecutor intends to call him or her as a witness.”). 
299. See, e.g., NATAPOFF, supra note 50, at 28 (listing various informant incentives, including 
drugs, money, clothing, and other gifts); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21(c)(2) (“[P]rosecution shall 
timely disclose . . . any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit that the offering party has made or 
will make in the future to the informant.”); E.S.S.B. 5038. 
300. E.S.S.B. 5038. 
301. See, e.g., State v. Statler, 160 Wash. App. 622, 630, 248 P.3d 165, 169 (2011) (finding three 
later-exonerated men guilty based on informant testimony); State v. Larson, 160 Wash. App. 577, 
595, 249 P.3d 669, 677 (2011) (same); State v. Gassman, 160 Wash. App. 600, 607, 248 P.3d 155, 
158 (2011) (same); cf. State v. Gassman, 175 Wash. 2d 208, 210, 283 P.3d 1113, 1114 (2012) 
(reversing sanctions against the government that it received because of constantly changing the 
defendants’ alleged crime date). All three of these cases resulted in the wrongful conviction of three 
men because the testifying incentivized informant wanted his other three accomplices to remain 
free. 
302. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 684 (1985). 
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This definition excludes from “benefit” something that is an ordinary 
transaction cost borne by the government.303 These costs include per 
diem, housing, and transportation.304 These were excluded from the 
definition of “benefit” in ESSB 5038 because they are so small that they 
are unlikely to act as an incentive for a witness to testify. This definition 
also helps reduce concerns about confidential informants, mentioned in 
Part I, by excluding some disclosures under a court-issued protection 
order.305 
It is more difficult for the government to know a witness’s subjective 
view of what a benefit is.306 Despite this uncertainty, the government can 
often discover or anticipate what benefits a witness might expect and 
why.307 For example, if the government has the discretion to 
significantly reduce a witness’s sentence, but has not promised to do so, 
then this should still warrant disclosure to the defense.308 
b. “Informant” Should Be Defined as a Witness Who Testifies for the 
Government in Exchange for a Benefit 
The second term, “informant,” is someone who testifies on behalf of 
the government in exchange for or in expectation of a benefit.309 The 
informant is a government witness who has a stake in testifying at 
trial.310 For example, Washington State’s E.S.S.B. 5038 offers the 
following definition of “informant”: 
                                                     
303. E.S.S.B. 5038. 
304. Id. 
305. Id.; see also Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957). 
306. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21 (2017) (limiting the government’s disclosure obligation 
to promises or offers that the government made to the informant, as well as other information that 
the government discovers through the course of its investigation). 
307. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL (CALJIC) 3.20 (2016) (“In evaluating this 
testimony, you should consider the extent to which it may have been influenced by the receipt of, or 
expectation of, any benefits from the party calling that witness.”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-
21(c) (requiring the government to disclose any deal, promise, or inducement “that the offering 
party has made or will make in the future to the informant” (emphasis added)). The Illinois State 
government requires the prosecution anticipate future promises and disclose this to the defense. 
308. THE JUSTICE PROJECT, JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY: A POLICY REVIEW 7 (2007), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/death_penalty_re
form/jailhouse20snitch20testimony20policy20briefpdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4Q5-PYST] (giving 
a list of jurisdictions whose jury instructions tell the jury to consider a witness’s expected benefits 
for testifying, including Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, and 
Wisconsin). 
309. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL, supra note 307; E.S.S.B. 5038. 
310. See E.S.S.B. 5038 § 1(2)(a). 
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(2)(a) “Informant” means the following individuals who provide 
information or testimony in exchange for, or in expectation of, a 
benefit: (i) Any criminal suspect, whether or not he or she is 
detained or incarcerated; and (ii) Any incarcerated individual. 
(b) An informant does not include an expert witness or a victim 
of the crime being prosecuted.311 
An incentivized informant has something to gain from testifying.312 It 
is legally acceptable for the government to use these types of 
witnesses.313 But all material impeachment evidence about these 
witnesses must be turned over to the defense in anticipation of trial.314 
So, the next step is to determine what information materially affects an 
informant’s credibility. 
c. Determining the Criteria Material to an Informant’s Credibility as 
a Witness 
Material exculpatory impeachment evidence for a government 
witness must be turned over to the defense.315 Whether evidence is 
material depends on if there is a “reasonable probability” that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the proceeding’s outcome would 
have been different.316 
The information that bears on an informant’s credibility as a witness 
according to U.S. Supreme Court case law includes (1) prior inconsistent 
statements or false statements made by a witness or informant;317 (2) any 
material exculpatory evidence favorable to the defendant that is known 
by others acting on the government’s behalf;318 (3) the prosecutor’s 
                                                     
311. E.S.S.B. 5038; see also Robert M. Bloom, Jailhouse Informants, 18 CRIM. JUST. MAG. 1, 
(2003), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_magazine_home/crimjust_spring 
2003_jailhouse.html [https://perma.cc/A38V-3Y3G] (criticizing the unreliability and history of 
using incentivized informants). 
312. See, e.g., H.B. 34, 85th Leg. Sess. (Tex. 2017) (“An attorney representing the state shall 
track . . . any benefits offered or provided to a person in exchange for testimony described by 
Subdivision (1).”). 
313. See generally Larson v. State, 194 Wash. App. 722, 725, 375 P.3d 1096, 1098 (2016), 
review denied, 186 Wash. 2d 1025, 385 P.3d 117 (2016); NATAPOFF, supra note 50, at 28.  
314. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
315. Id. 
316. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 440–41 (1995). One of the issues with materiality is that it 
can be difficult to assess and enforce. Whether something could reasonably affect the trial’s 
outcome can usually be determined only when the trial is over or nearing completion. Moreover, 
even if something is material, a losing defendant would have to know about missing material 
evidence and press for its disclosure on appeal. 
317. See id. at 453–54; Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153. 
318. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. 
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knowing use of perjured testimony;319 (4) charges the witness or 
informant is facing—if the charges are associated with a deal or bargain 
with the government;320 (5) benefits the prosecution promises to the 
witness or informant;321 and (6) prior criminal convictions.322 
Those seeking to expand the scope of “material” information under 
Brady can do so using statutes, court rules, or other guidelines.323 The 
following example is some of the material information required by a bill 
proposed in the Washington State Legislature in the 2017 legislative 
session: 
(a) The complete criminal history of the informant, including 
any pending criminal charges or investigations in which the 
informant is a suspect; (b) Any benefit the state has provided or 
may provide in the future to the informant in the present case, 
including any written agreement related to a benefit, and 
information related to the informant’s breach of any conditions 
contained within the agreement; (c) The substance, time, and 
place of any statement allegedly given by the defendant to the 
informant, and the substance, time, and place of any statement 
given by the informant to law enforcement implicating the 
defendant in the crime charged, including the names of all 
persons present when any statement was allegedly given by the 
defendant to the informant . . . [and] (i) Any other material or 
information in the possession, custody, or control of the state 
that bears on the credibility or reliability of the informant or the 
informant’s statement.324 
These definitions—what “informant,” “incentive,” and “material” 
mean—lay the foundation for legislatures, courts, and other government 
actors to propose solutions for the incentivized informant issue. Going 
                                                     
319. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). 
320. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). Some jurisdictions go as far as to require 
prosecutors to disclose all current charges against an informant, even if no deal or agreement is 
formally discussed. See, e.g., Ruetter v. Solem, 888 F.2d 578, 581 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that the 
government’s failure to disclose to the defense that the government’s key witness had applied for 
sentence commutation was a Brady violation which required reversing the defendant’s conviction). 
321. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 684. 
322. See id. at 113–14 (holding that prosecutor’s failure to disclose victim-witness’s criminal 
record, though relevant under Brady, nonetheless did not require disclosure because it was not 
material to the case); see also WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.7(a)(vi) (2016) (“[T]he prosecuting 
attorney shall disclose to the defendant . . . any record of prior criminal convictions known to the 
prosecuting attorney.”). 
323. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21 (2017) (requiring the government to turn over “any 
other information relevant to the informant’s credibility”). 
324. E.S.S.B. 5038, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017). 
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beyond current case law, these actors have a variety of options to reduce 
wrongful imprisonment caused by incentivized informant testimony: 
statutes, court rules, informant databases, and jury instructions. 
B. State Statutes Can Protect and Bolster Brady’s Constitutional 
Guarantees by Regulating Incentivized Informants 
State statutes are an effective way to regulate incentivized informant 
testimony.325 As described earlier, these statutes can define “incentivized 
informant” and describe what information the government must collect 
and disclose.326 These statutes can directly tell the government, including 
law enforcement and prosecutors, what information to collect and 
disclose.327 Or, a statute may give discretion to the court or prosecutors 
on how to regulate informants.328 
One example of a statute giving discretion to courts is pretrial 
reliability hearings.329 A pretrial reliability hearing gives the presiding 
judge the ability to screen a potential witness and exclude this witness if 
the judge thinks that this witness is not credible.330 This hearing is 
similar to in camera review and reliability hearings for experts.331 Just 
like expert witnesses, the judge would determine whether the informant 
is credible enough and has sufficient knowledge to testify.332 
Illinois currently uses pretrial reliability hearings to vet incentivized 
informants: 
The court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the 
testimony of the informant is reliable, unless the defendant 
waives such a hearing. If the prosecution fails to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the informant’s testimony is 
reliable, the court shall not allow the testimony to be heard at 
trial. At this hearing, the court shall consider the factors 
                                                     
325. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1111.5 (West 2017); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21; H.B. 34, 85th 
Leg. Sess. (Tex. 2017); E.S.S.B. 5038. 
326. See. e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21. 
327. See id. 
328. Id. 
329. Id. 
330. Id. (“If the prosecution fails to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the informant’s 
testimony is reliable, the court shall not allow the testimony to be heard at trial.”). 
331. FED. R. EVID. 702; Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
332. See FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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enumerated in subsection (c) as well as any other factors relating 
to reliability.333 
While the pretrial reliability hearing can do some good, its ultimate 
effectiveness depends on what the judge decides is or is not reliable.334 
In addition, it takes from the trier of fact the ability to assess a witness’s 
credibility.335 Unlike expert testimony, a person’s credibility is not based 
on technical information.336 One could argue that the judge is so familiar 
with the criminal justice system that she is better suited to assess 
credibility than jurors. But this could also dangerously blur the line 
between the judge as the “gatekeeper” and the jury as the trier of fact.337 
Another option that some statutes use is to require independent 
corroboration for informant testimony: there must be independent 
evidence verifying the truth of the informant’s testimony, such as the 
defendant’s DNA at the scene of the crime.338 Indeed, the California 
Penal Code requires independent corroboration.339 Yet even 
corroboration may not be enough in some situations.340 In the Statler 
cases, discussed earlier in this Comment, police found a shotgun in Paul 
Statler’s home.341 The police noted that this shotgun matched a witness’s 
description of the shotgun used in the robbery.342 Then the prosecuting 
attorney’s office used this independently corroborated information with 
false incentivized informant testimony at trial.343 Three men—Statler, 
Gassman, and Larson—were convicted based on this information.344 
                                                     
333. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21. 
334. See JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY: A POLICY REVIEW, supra note 308, at 7. 
335. ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, ACLU, THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT ACCOUNTABILITY ACT: 
PROPOSALS, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/drugpolicy/informant_proposedlegislation. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/HTA8-VES4]. 
336. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589–92. 
337. See generally id. 
338. “A jury or judge may not convict a defendant, find a special circumstance true, or use a fact 
in aggravation based on the uncorroborated testimony of an in-custody informant.” CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 1111.5 (West 2017). 
339. Id. 
340. See, e.g., Larson v. State, 194 Wash. App. 722, 726–27, 375 P.3d 1096, 1098–99 (2016), 
review denied, 186 Wash. 2d 1025, 385 P.3d 117 (2016) (reversing trial court’s imposition of a 
heightened burden for claimants like Statler, Larson, and Gassman to get compensation under 
Washington’s wrongful conviction statute). 
341. Larson, 194 Wash. App. at 726–27, 375 P.3d at 1098–99. 
342. Id. 
343. Id. 
344. Id. at 729, 375 P.3d at 1101. 
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They were later found innocent after officials discovered that the 
informant, Dunham, lied about the trio’s involvement.345 
An additional option is to use court rules to encourage government 
disclosure of informants.346 These too can be pushed by state 
legislatures, or courts can take the initiative and pass these rules. 
Examples include the American Bar Association’s Model Rule 3.8, 
Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor, and states’ equivalent ethical 
rules.347 However, even court rules have limitations: government actors 
are rarely punished for violating Rule 3.8.348 
Statutes can be used as one method to regulate incentivized 
informants in the criminal justice system. However, pushback in some 
state legislatures by law enforcement, prosecutors, and other organized 
groups may be a major obstacle to passing these types of statutes.349 
C. Informant Databases Force Prosecutors and Law Enforcement to 
Account for Their Informants 
As noted earlier in this Comment, the issue with incentivized 
informants is not solely with prosecutors. Law enforcement also plays a 
major role in the use of this type of testimony.350 Sometimes prosecutors 
lack information about an informant that law enforcement possesses.351 
                                                     
345. See Clouse, supra note 253. 
346. See WASH. SUPER. CT. R. 4.7 (a)(vi) (2016). 
347. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017); see also Wayne D. 
Garris, Jr., Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8: The ABA Takes a Stand Against Wrongful 
Convictions, 22 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 829, 836 (2009) (describing the potential for new provisions 
in the ethical rules to encourage prosecutors to take a more active role in preventing wrongful 
convictions). 
348. See Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, It Is Not Whether You Win or Lose, It Is How You Play the 
Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice for Prosecutors?, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 
283, 300–01 (2001). 
349. See, e.g., E.S.S.B. 5038, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017) (failing to pass informant 
reform bill in the state House after strong opposition by organized law enforcement and prosecutor 
interest groups—the Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs (WASPC) and the 
Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys (WAPA)). 
350. See STATE’S DUTY TO DISCLOSE EXCULPATORY MATERIAL EXTENDED BEYOND 
INDIVIDUAL PROSECUTOR ASSIGNED TO CASE, 20 NO. 10 CRIM. PRAC. REP. 3 (“Unknown to the 
prosecuting attorney, for the past 10 years the snitch had been a police informant for the local police 
department and even had his own confidential informant number.” (citing Maryland v. Williams, 
896 A.2d 973 (Md. 2006)). 
351. See generally Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867 (2006). 
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And what prosecutors do not know, they cannot disclose to the 
defense.352 
Databases tracking informant information, including their names, 
promises the government offered them, and other information affecting 
informants’ credibility is another solution.353 This is a solution that can 
be self-enforcing, meaning law enforcement and prosecutors collect this 
information as a matter of internal policy.354 But experience suggests 
that consistent compliance to collect and maintain an informant database 
may be better done through statute.355 
Federal law does not mandate that prosecutors and law enforcement 
share databases cataloging informants.356 However, databases are a 
practical way to make sure prosecutors have all the information that they 
need to turn over to the defense.357 Furthermore, this information should 
be available to the court or the defense when noncompliance is 
suspected. Databases are also a way for prosecutors to satisfy their 
constitutional “duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the 
others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the 
police.”358 
Even though databases can be used to expose the information and 
history of an informant, a proper compliance mechanism is required.359 
For state legislatures considering enacting a database law for informants, 
the Clark County, Nevada case is instructive: legislators created a 
subcommittee to investigate informant databases due to a lack of entries 
                                                     
352. Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 237, 273 (“[T]he answer to 
Brady violations might be finding a way to relieve police and prosecutors of the responsibility for 
identifying ‘exculpatory’ evidence rather than punishing them for perceived misconduct.”). 
353. NEVADA LEG. 2016 INTERIM MINUTES, supra note 266, at 1. 
354. NEVADA LEG. JULY 7, 2008 MINUTES, supra note 270, at 70 (statement of Christopher J. 
Lalli). 
355. See NEVADA LEG. 2016 INTERIM MINUTES, supra note 266, at 1. 
356. See Associated Press, Authorities Fear Dangers of Online ‘Rat’ Database, NBC NEWS 
(Nov. 30, 2006, 10:05 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/15978145/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/ 
authorities-fear-dangers-online-rat-database/#.WjS_3d-nHyQ [https://perma.cc/5PT5-3ASK]. 
357. See Williamson, supra note 131 (“The database tracking inmates’ movements around the jail 
and the reason for those movements is significant, because Orange County law enforcement and 
prosecutors were in the habit of placing targeted suspects in proximity to criminal informants.”). 
358. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). 
359. See, e.g., NEVADA LEG. 2016 INTERIM MINUTES, supra note 266, at 1 (discussing the need 
for legislative action after a county prosecuting attorney’s office failed to maintain an informant 
database). 
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in a self-enforced CCDAO—a prosecutor’s office—informant 
database.360 
Whether the CCDAO’s lack of action came from willful disobedience 
or mere neglect,361 a law requiring prosecutors to catalog informants in a 
database may encourage greater compliance with informant databases. 
Informant databases should be a joint responsibility for law 
enforcement and prosecutors. In this way, prosecutors are not solely 
liable for failures to provide information about government 
informants.362 This system is also more robust because law enforcement 
is usually the first government actor to deal with informants.363 If law 
enforcement and prosecutors are forced to work together in maintaining 
an informant database, then neither can blame the other for failing to 
provide this information. Both would be legally required to comply. The 
onus would not just fall on prosecutors to gather and maintain an 
informant database. 
D. Jury Instructions: Alerting Jurors About Non-Credible Witnesses Is 
an Incremental Step to Regulate the Effect of False Incentivized 
Informant Testimony 
Several jurisdictions have enacted jury instruction requirements that 
warn juries of the incentives that witnesses may have to testify and lie.364 
The purpose is to ensure that jurors adequately account for potentially 
dubious testimony from incentivized informants.365 But empirical 
                                                     
360. Barnes, supra note 264; see also NEVADA LEG. 2016 INTERIM MINUTES, supra note 266, at 
1. 
361. Records strongly indicate that the CCPAO was neglectful and did not make the time to enter 
informants into the database. An email from the Chief Deputy District Attorney to the CCPAO 
stated in part: “[s]eems like it’s time for a little reminder about the inducement index . . . I received 
a stream of emails to make entries into the index after my last reminder. But, the stream has dried 
up. So, either no inducements are being given or else people are forgetting about the index.” Barnes, 
supra note 264. 
362. Though it is, ultimately, the prosecutors who face a motion for a new trial if law 
enforcement fails to turn over material information about an informant. Youngblood v. West 
Virginia, 547 U.S. 867 (2006). 
363. See NATAPOFF supra note 50, at 84–85 (noting that police are subject to few documentation 
requirements, and their decisions to make an arrest or investigate a crime are not usually subject to 
judicial challenge or review). 
364. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL, supra note 307 (“The testimony of 
an in-custody informant should be viewed with caution and close scrutiny. In evaluating this 
testimony, you should consider the extent to which it may have been influenced by the receipt of, or 
expectation of, any benefits from the party calling that witness.”). 
365. See, e.g., Instructing About Informer’s Testimony, 2 FEDERAL TRIAL HANDBOOK: CRIMINAL 
§ 75:22 (4th ed.) (“While the testimony of an informer is competent evidence, it should be 
accompanied by instructions designed to call the attention of the jury to the character of the 
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evidence indicates that these jury instructions may not have a significant 
impact in preventing wrongful convictions.366 
Several states have jury instructions specifically for informant 
testimony.367 One example of this type of jury instruction comes from 
North Carolina: 
You may find from the evidence that a State’s witness is 
interested in the outcome of this case because of the witness’ 
activities as an [informer] [undercover agent]. If so, you should 
examine such testimony with care and caution in light of that 
interest. If, after doing so, you believe the testimony in whole or 
in part, you should treat what you believe the same as any other 
believable evidence.368 
Another example of jury instructions addressing informant testimony 
comes from Alaska: 
An informant is someone who provides evidence against 
someone else for money or to escape or reduce punishment for 
[his] [her] own misdeeds or crimes. The testimony of an 
informant must be examined and weighed by the jury with 
greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness. The jury 
must determine whether the informant’s testimony has been 
affected by the agreement [he] [she] has with the prosecution or 
[his] [her] own interest in the outcome of this case or by 
prejudice against the defendant.369 
Even if jury instructions do not often affect a jury’s decision in 
incentivized informant cases, these instructions are a step in the right 
                                                     
informer, leaving to the jury the question of the value and credibility of his testimony. . . However, 
where the informer’s testimony has been adequately corroborated, no specific instruction relating 
directly to the testimony of informer is required.” (citations omitted)). 
366. NATAPOFF, supra note 50, at 178; see also Jeffrey S. Neuschatz et al., The Effects of 
Accomplice Witnesses and Jailhouse Informants on Jury Decision Making, 32 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 137 (2008) (describing two small-scale experiments showing that jurors’ verdict decisions 
did not change appreciably when they were told that a witness was getting a benefit to testify). 
367. See ALASKA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) 1.23 (2017); CALIFORNIA JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL, supra note 307. 
368. NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIM 104.30 (2015); see also United 
States v. Luck, 611 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel when the 
defendant’s counsel failed to request an informant jury instruction); Bryan Gates, Failure to Request 
a Jury Instruction on Informants, N.C. CRIM. L.: UNC SCH. GOV’T BLOG (July 13, 2010), 
http://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/failure-to-request-a-jury-instruction-on-informants/ 
[https://perma.cc/V83F-7WXC] (suggesting that a defense counsel’s failure to request an informant 
jury instruction after United States v. Luck is automatically ineffective assistance of counsel). 
369. ALASKA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION (CRIMINAL), supra note 367. 
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direction.370 Instead of taking the government’s witness at face value as 
a credible actor, the jury is asked to consider whether the witness has 
any incentives to lie. As such, a jury instruction, even if negligible in 
application, is better than nothing. But a more effective step in the right 
direction in preventing wrongful imprisonment from incentivized 
informants would involve disclosing informant information during plea 
deals.371 
IV. AFTER RUIZ: REQUIRING INCENTIVIZED INFORMANT 
DISCLOSURE BEFORE PLEA DEALS WHEN THE 
GOVERNMENT’S CASE RELIES ON MATERIAL 
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE SUPPORTING ACTUAL 
INNOCENCE 
While this Comment proposes solutions to prevent wrongful 
imprisonment caused by false incentivized informant testimony for a 
defendant facing trial, plea deals comprise the bulk of how criminal 
cases end.372 Indeed, out of 83,941 federal cases in 2010, 96.8% of these 
cases ended in plea deals instead of a trial.373 And at the state level, in 
2006, 94% of the 592,420 sample state felony cases ended in guilty 
pleas.374 Yet in United States v. Ruiz, the Supreme Court found that the 
Constitution generally does not require pre-guilty plea disclosure of 
impeachment information partly because it is difficult to tell when this 
information is useful to the accused.375 
This Part first dissects Ruiz’s analysis. It compares Ruiz to different 
U.S. Courts of Appeals’ interpretations.376 It also describes how Ruiz, 
                                                     
370. NATAPOFF, supra note 50, at 178. 
371. Id. at 81. 
372. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING: 
RESEARCH SUMMARY (2011), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargainingResearchSummary 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/LY56-T3NC] (“[S]cholars estimate that about 90 to 95 percent of both federal 
and state court cases are resolved through this process [of plea deals].”). 
373. 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, supra note 50. 
374. SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN 
STATE COURTS, 2006 – STATISTICAL TABLES 25 tbl.4.1 (2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/fssc06st.pdf [https://perma.cc/NK4P-PXPK]. The total sample size of state court guilty pleas 
was 592,420. Id. at 43. The average guilty plea prison sentence was 1.4 months compared to 8.9 
months for trial cases. Id. at 44. The large discrepancy between plea sentences and trial sentences 
may be attributed to higher penalties—or less to lose—under certain circumstances, which cause a 
defendant to take their case to trial. 
375. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002). 
376. See, e.g., Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 622 (6th Cir. 2014) (“We do not decide whether 
appellants have a constitutional right to receive exculpatory Brady material from law enforcement 
prior to entering into a plea agreement.”). 
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U.S. Supreme Court precedent, and other case law support a standard 
which sometimes requires the government to turn over exculpatory 
informant information before a plea deal. Finally, this Part offers a legal 
standard consistent with Ruiz’s reasoning that courts can follow to 
require the government to turn over this information. This is especially 
important, because some U.S. Courts of Appeals are split on how to 
interpret Ruiz in the plea deal context.377 
A. Ruiz’s Reasoning and Other Supreme Court Precedent Support a 
Standard to Require Disclosing Material Exculpatory Evidence 
Before Plea Deals 
Ruiz leaves open the possibility that, if exculpatory evidence is 
material to the accused’s defense, or a lack of information about a 
dubious informant prevents a valid constitutional waiver for a valid plea 
deal, then the government must turn over exculpatory information about 
an informant.378 Both arguments come from Ruiz’s narrow case-specific 
analysis and U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 
As a part of the Ruiz Court’s reasoning, it considered the ability of a 
court to determine whether information about an informant is useful to 
the accused.379 However, if the government’s case stands or falls based 
on an informant’s testimony—material exculpatory evidence supporting 
factual innocence—a court can readily determine that this information 
would be useful to the accused.380 That is, false informant testimony that 
is the primary basis for the government’s case is not a “degree of help” 
that will “depend upon the defendant’s own independent knowledge of 
the prosecution’s potential case.”381 Unlike impeachment evidence, 
disclosing exculpatory evidence would make a potentially innocent 
suspect feel less pressure to agree to a plea deal. In contrast, a guilty 
suspect would not get this information and would feel more pressure to 
                                                     
377. See United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 286 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting a split between 
the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ interpretation of Ruiz). 
378. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629. 
379. Id. at 639. For a brief discussion countering Justice Thomas’s valid concern in his 
concurrence about improperly relying on a “usefulness standard,” see supra note 250. 
380. See, e.g., McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Thus, we have a 
question not directly addressed by Ruiz: whether a criminal defendant’s guilty plea can ever be 
‘voluntary’ when the government possesses evidence that would exonerate the defendant of any 
criminal wrongdoing but fails to disclose such evidence during plea negotiations or before the entry 
of the plea.”). 
381. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630. 
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accept a plea deal.382 As the Seventh Circuit properly notes, government 
knowledge about an informant may sometimes rise to the level of 
material exculpatory evidence implicating due process and the validity 
of constitutional waivers.383 
The Ruiz Court also stated that a valid constitutional waiver of a plea 
deal must be knowing, intelligent, voluntary, and made with sufficient 
awareness, but that it does not require complete knowledge of the 
information.384 The Court acknowledged that sometimes the accused 
must know some of this information, but that the defendant Ruiz did not 
need to know these facts in her case given that immigration agents had 
already found thirty kilograms of marijuana in her luggage.385 There was 
little support in Ruiz’s case that she needed to know the impeachment 
information to make a voluntary waiver. 
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court in Boykin v. Alabama386 
reiterated a long-held principle: a guilty plea cannot be truly voluntary 
unless the defendant understands the law in relation to the facts.387 
Unlike Ruiz’s case, where additional facts about impeachment evidence 
would not help her understanding of her case when she was caught with 
over sixty-five pounds of marijuana, other cases would differ.388 
When an informant’s testimony provides the primary evidence 
pointing toward guilt, and the government knows of its falsity, then the 
accused may not understand the true facts of the case without knowing 
key information about the informant.389 In these cases, defendants cannot 
                                                     
382. See Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/ [https://perma.cc/ 
G9R4-2W2C] (“Against this background, the information-deprived defense lawyer, typically within 
a few days after the arrest, meets with the overconfident prosecutor, who makes clear that, unless 
the case can be promptly resolved by a plea bargain, he intends to charge the defendant with the 
most severe offenses he can prove.”). 
383. See Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782. 
384. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630. 
385. Id. at 625. 
386. 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 
387. Id. at 243 n.5 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 466 (1938)). 
388. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625. 
389. See Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 466 (“[A] prisoner in custody pursuant to the final judgment of a 
state court of criminal jurisdiction may have a judicial inquiry in a court of the United States into 
the very truth and substance of the causes of his detention.”). This Comment notes the very real 
danger that some guilty criminals will learn that the state’s evidence is weak or the evidence is 
something not tying them to their crime, refuse a plea deal, risk trial, and in some cases, get away 
without punishment. This risk is real. However, given the duty of the government to protect a 
person’s life, liberty, and the fact that nearly 50% of wrongful capital conviction cases are 
attributable to dubious snitch testimony, the risk is well worth it. See THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); Warden, supra note 13. 
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validly waive their constitutional rights and accept a plea deal. This is 
because defendants are not aware of the relevant circumstances and 
likely consequences of going to trial, as opposed to accepting a guilty 
plea. 
The Ruiz Court uses the analogy of a defendant waiving her right to 
remain silent: she can waive this right even though she does not know 
the specific questions that she will be asked.390 But this waiver is 
different than a plea deal waiver. A waiver of the right to remain silent is 
premised on answering a set of any questions. But a plea deal waiver is 
premised on the accused’s belief that the government has a legitimate, 
non-fabricated, case.391 
Moreover, targeting situations where the government’s case is mostly 
based on an informant’s testimony, and the government has material 
exculpatory evidence supporting actual innocence, would not overly 
burden the government in its use of informants. That is because this only 
applies to a subset of cases where the government primarily relies on 
informant testimony for its case and the government knows it is false. 
Yet even if requiring the government to turn over this type of 
information before a plea deal involves a lot of cases, this is more cause 
for concern: many more people are at risk of pleading guilty to crimes 
that they did not commit.392 
Ruiz and other U.S. Supreme Court precedent leave open—and 
strongly suggest—a constitutional requirement that the government turn 
over material exculpatory evidence supporting factual innocence to the 
accused before plea deals.393 
Indeed, the Seventh Circuit was correct in applying a distinction 
between exculpatory and impeachment evidence.394 Material evidence 
supporting factual innocence bears on whether the guilty plea is 
voluntary because a defendant must understand the basic facts of their 
case.395 Mere impeachment evidence goes to credibility, which does not 
affect voluntariness of a guilty plea.396 That is, impeachment evidence 
                                                     
390. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 632. 
391. See McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787 (7th Cir. 2003). 
392. See Rakoff, supra note 382. 
393. Compare United States v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (rejecting 
distinction between impeachment and exculpatory evidence under Ruiz in the context of plea deals), 
with Mangialardi, 337 F.3d at 787–88 (stating that when the government knowingly and primarily 
relies on non-credible informant testimony, then Ruiz strongly suggests disclosure before a guilty 
plea). 
394. See generally Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782. 
395. See generally Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 
396. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 623. 
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does not go to the facts of the case, but the weight of the government’s 
case. In contrast, material exculpatory evidence—the government’s 
knowledge that the accused is innocent because the informant lied—
goes to the core facts of the case.397 This is much like the video evidence 
in Alvarez v. City of Brownsville.398 In Alvarez, there was material 
exculpatory evidence showing that the defendant was actually innocent: 
the video showed that the defendant did not assault the detention officer 
and that this detention officer was lying.399 
Similarly, the Second Circuit supports a pre-plea requirement for 
exculpatory information.400 Prior to Ruiz, the Second Circuit found that 
the government’s obligation to disclose Brady materials is relevant to the 
accused’s decision to plead guilty.401 Specifically, a defendant is entitled 
to full awareness of evidence favorable to the accused and known by the 
government.402 This included material exculpatory information about 
informants.403 
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit noted that Ruiz did not address 
whether the government is required to disclose exculpatory, rather than 
impeachment, evidence before a plea deal.404 The Fourth Circuit also 
noted this split in 2010.405 
                                                     
397. See Mangialardi, 337 F.3d at 788. 
398. 860 F.3d 799 (5th Cir. 2017). 
399. Id. at 800. 
400. See United States v. Persico, 164 F.3d 796, 804–05 (2d. Cir. 1999). 
401. Id. at 804. 
402. Id. 
403. Id. at 804–05. Even though Perisco was decided before Ruiz, it was based on both material 
impeachment and exculpatory evidence. Post Ruiz, lower district courts in the Second Circuit 
continue to require pre-plea disclosures for material exculpatory evidence. See, e.g., United States v. 
Danzi, 726 F. Supp. 2d 120, 128 (D. Conn. 2010) (“[T]he Second Circuit has not yet had an 
opportunity to consider whether Ruiz’s reasoning—that impeachment material need not be disclosed 
to a criminal defendant pre-plea—also encompasses exculpatory material . . . [t]he Court declines 
the Government’s invitation to hold that Ruiz applies to exculpatory as well as impeachment 
material”). But see Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 154 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court has 
consistently treated exculpatory and impeachment evidence in the same way for the purpose of 
defining the obligation of a prosecutor to provide Brady material prior to trial . . . and the reasoning 
underlying Ruiz could support a similar ruling for a prosecutor’s obligations prior to a guilty plea.” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
404. United States v. Webb, 651 Fed. App’x 740, 744 (10th Cir. 2016) (noting the circuit split on 
the pre-plea issue, but not deciding it because the government did not possess the information 
before the plea). These pre-plea issues raise another important question: is the government required 
to fix the issue once it gets exculpatory information after a guilty plea and sentencing? The answer, 
at least according to the American Bar Association, is yes. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
405. United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 286 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Price v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice Att’y Office, 865 F.3d 676, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“a ‘prosecutor is permitted to consider 
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Given that U.S. Supreme Court precedent and the U.S. Constitution 
suggest some form of pre-plea disclosure, the final task is to articulate a 
legal standard that conforms with the Ruiz Court’s analysis. 
B. The Plea Deal Standard Completing Ruiz: When the Government 
Must Turn over Material Exculpatory Evidence to the Accused 
Before a Plea Deal 
The Ruiz Court’s major concerns about pre-plea disclosures were 
whether a court could tell if the evidence in question was material, and 
about interfering with the government’s use of informants.406 For the 
first concern, if the government’s case primarily relies on an informant’s 
testimony, where the government knows of the accused’s factual 
innocence, then this evidence should automatically be disclosed to the 
defense.407 Indeed, Justice Thomas in his concurrence noted the Ruiz 
majority’s reliance on the ‘usefulness to the accused’ standard: “[t]he 
Court, however, suggests that the constitutional analysis turns in some 
part on the ‘degree of help’ such information would provide to the 
defendant at the plea stage.”408 Similarly, for the second concern, the 
government only has to disclose information about informants in limited 
situations where the government has evidence of the accused’s factual 
innocence.409 
                                                     
only legitimate criminal justice concerns in striking [a plea] bargain’” and “[t]his set of legitimate 
interests places boundaries on the rights that can be bargained away in plea negotiations” (citations 
omitted)); Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 401 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
406. See generally United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002). 
407. Disclosure is compelled not under Brady, but to comply with the U.S. Constitution. 
408. Id. at 633. Justice Thomas opposed the majority’s constitutional analysis of providing 
information before plea deals based on the usefulness of certain types of information to the 
defendant or the accused. He thought this was wrong because Brady—the majority’s focal case in 
Ruiz—strictly focused on avoiding an unfair trial to the accused. Id. at 633–34. He makes a good 
point. However, even if the majority improperly relied on Brady for its “usefulness to the defendant 
or accused” analysis, their conclusion that sometimes this information may have to be provided 
before plea deals is still proper when relying on two separate, more sound standards this Comment 
previously raised: (1) a guilty plea cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant understands the 
law in relation to the facts, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969) (citing Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 466 (1938) (emphasis added)); and (2) there must be an adequate record for 
the court to review to ensure that the accused fully understands the plea and its consequences. 
Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243–44 (“When the judge discharges that function, he leaves a record adequate 
for any review that may be later sought . . . and forestalls the spin-off of collateral proceedings that 
seek to probe murky memories.” (citations omitted)). 
409. The government may also request a court-issued protection order. See, e.g., E.S.S.B. 5038, 
65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017) (allowing the government to apply for a court-issued protection 
order to protect a witness’s identity). 
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Thus, consistent with the Seventh Circuit’s position, this Comment 
proposes the following standard for when the government must turn over 
material exculpatory evidence about an informant: 
When the government’s case primarily relies on informant 
testimony that it knows is false and shows actual innocence, 
then the government must disclose this information before a 
guilty plea. The government’s knowledge of the accused’s 
factual innocence, without the accused’s knowledge, means that 
the accused cannot be sufficiently aware of the facts needed to 
make a voluntary waiver of the accused’s constitutional 
rights.410 
Government power’s coercive nature and an accused’s inability to be 
sufficiently aware that the government is relying on false informant 
testimony requires better disclosure. When the government’s case 
mostly depends on informant testimony, evidence of factual innocence 
should be given to the accused before a plea deal.411 Especially because 
it is very rare that the accused will accept a plea deal, later discover that 
most of the government’s case was based on unreliable informant 
testimony, and successfully appeal their sentence, without spending a 
long time in jail or prison.412 
                                                     
410. See McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787 (7th Cir. 2003); Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 n.5 
(1969) (citing Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 466). This standard may also be applied to the non-informant 
context. 
411. See Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823 (7th Cir. 2016); Mangialardi, 337 F.3d at 787 (“The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ruiz strongly suggests that a Brady-type disclosure might be required 
under the circumstances of this particular case.”); Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti, Prosecutorial 
Resources, Plea Bargaining, and the Decision to Go to Trial, 17 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 149 (2001); 
Rakoff, supra note 382; Matthew Clarke, Dramatic Increase in Percentage of Criminal Cases Being 
Plea Bargained, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Jan. 15, 2013), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/ 
news/2013/jan/15/dramatic-increase-in-percentage-of-criminal-cases-being-plea-bargained/ [https:// 
perma.cc/SR77-K8W7]; Erica Goode, Stronger Hand for Judges in the ‘Bazaar’ of Plea Deals, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/stronger-hand-for-judges-
after-rulings-on-plea-deals.html [https://perma.cc/JK9Q-4RUN]; Christine Dempsey, State Victim 
Advocate: Too Many Plea Deals, HARTFORD COURANT (Nov. 19, 2010), http://articles.courant.com/ 
2010-11-19/news/hc-victim-advocate-request-1120-20101119_1_plea-bargains-michelle-cruz-trials 
[https://perma.cc/EFP6-DJRX]; The Plea, Introduction, FRONTLINE PBS (Jun. 17, 2004), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plea/etc/synopsis.html [https://perma.cc/38GJ-LA 
MN] (“[The judge] told me point blank—he said, “I will give your son 25 to life, so you better take 
the plea, or if you don’t take the plea, he’s getting it.” (internal quotations omitted)); The Plea, 
Interview with Defense Attorney Stephan Bright, FRONTLINE PBS (Jan. 29, 2004), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plea/interviews/bright.html [https://perma.cc/T8M 
Y-TM8V] (“One reason that a lot of people plead guilty is because they’re told they can go home 
that day because they’ll get probation. What they usually don’t take into account is that they’re 
being set up to fail.”). 
412. Goode, supra note 411. 
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CONCLUSION 
Reducing wrongful imprisonment caused by false informant 
testimony requires two steps: (1) determining the type of information 
that affects these informants’ credibility and how it should be collected, 
and (2) turning over this information to the accused and the court so that 
all actors can accurately assess these informants’ credibility. 
By redefining what “material” evidence is, legislatures, courts, and 
government actors can extend Brady’s scope to make the government 
more rigorously assess their use of incentivized informants. 
Furthermore, enhanced rules for collecting and disclosing information 
about informants increases the chances of finding not only pertinent 
credibility information but also material Brady evidence that may not 
have been otherwise discovered. These rules should apply to plea deals 
for both impeachment evidence and material exculpatory evidence. 
Lastly, Ruiz’s holding leaves open the opportunity to require the 
government to turn over material exculpatory evidence about informants 
that show the accused’s actual innocence.413 Because plea deals cover at 
least 95% of all criminal cases, both state and federal, this change would 
make a huge difference.414 At the very least, recent informant scandals—
and disputes among the U.S. Courts of Appeals—warrant another look at 
Ruiz and how it is interpreted.415 In light of this, the U.S. Supreme Court 
ought to reexamine and clarify its position in Ruiz. A desire for 
efficiency and a loyalty to precedent should not override a person’s core 
constitutional right of due process of law.416 
 
                                                     
413. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002). 
414. PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING, supra note 372; 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
SENTENCING STATISTICS, supra note 50; FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, supra note 374. 
415. Barnes, supra note 264; see also Dalton, supra note 215; United States v. Moussaoui, 591 
F.3d 263, 286 (4th Cir. 2010) (“To date, the Supreme Court has not addressed the question of 
whether the Brady right to exculpatory information, in contrast to impeachment information, might 
be extended to the guilty plea context.”). 
416. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I; Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 
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